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Cert to CA 5 
(Thornberry, C9leman, Ainsworth, 
Godbold; Mo~gan, Clark, -Gee, 
Tjofl~t, Hill and Fayr Jones and 
Roney, concurringr Brown and 
Goldberg, , dissenting) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: This case presents the question whether an 
implied cause of action exists under the Fifth Amendment for a 
federal employee discharged because of sex discrimination. If 
the Court were to recognize such an action, it would have to 
resolve whether the Speech or Debate Clause or political question 
doctrine b3rs a suit when the employer is a Congressman. 
2. 
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Petitioner was Deputy 
Administrative Assistant to Congressman Otto Passman in 1974. 
After six months of employment in that capacity, Congressman 
Passman discharged her in a letter stating: 
nyou a~e able, energetic and a very hard worker. 
Certainly you cornrnar.d the respect of those wi th whom you 
work~ however, on account of the unusually heavy work 
load in my Washington Office, and the diversity of the 
job, I concluded that it was essential that ~
understudy~ to my Administrative Assistant be  
Petitioner bought suit against respondent, grounding her c;a im on 
an implied cause of action under the Fifth Amendment and ~ivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 u.s. 388 (1971). 
The district court dismissed for failure to state a 
claim, ruling that petitioner's disch~did not violate the 
Fifth Amendment and that in any event Bivens did not extend to 
the Fifth Amendment. A panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed, 
holding that the Fifth Amendment prohibited the conduct in 
question and accorded petitioner an implied cause of action. 544 
F.2d 865 (1977). The panel also ruled that sovereign immunity 
and the Speech or Debate Clause did not apply to this suit, and 
that respondent enjoyed only a good faith and not an absolute 
immunity from suit. Because respondent had been voted out of 
office in the interim, only damages were at issue. Judge Jones 
suit violated the constitutional dissent~d~guing the 
separat~ of powers. 
On rehearing en bane, the Fifth Circuit reversed the 




suit. 571 F.2d 793 (1978). Judge Clark's opinion for the 
majority recognized that every circuit that had confronted the 
question, including the Fifth, had extended Bivens to other 
provisions of the Constitution, including the due process 
guaranty of the Fifth Amendment. The court was persuaded, 
however, to reexamine its own precedents and to rule that an 
implied cause of action was not necessary to effectuate the 
- . 
safeguards of that Amendment. Applying the Cort v. Ash test 
-------- -----~ 
implying a cause of action from statutes, the court held that th 
deliberate decision of Congress not to apply Title VII 
militated against implication of an antidiscrimination cause of 
~----~-------------action here. The court also expressed concern about the caseload -problems such an action might present. In conclusion, the court 
declared, "Given these consequences and our inability to 
construct a plausible measure for acceptable limits on the right 
of action Davis would have us imply to remedy the wrong alleged, 
we refuse to take even a first step down the slippery slope until 
the Supreme Court answers the open question of whether any such 
right should exist." Because of its resolution of the implied 
cause of action issue, the majority did not address the Speech or 
Debate or other immunity issues. ,_______________ - --
Judge Hill concurred specially, arguing that the staff 
hiring decisions of Congressmen were relegated by the 
~
Con:t~n ~o the discretion of Congress and we~ct 
to judicial interference. Judge Roney also concurred, arguing 
that although it was appropriate to imply a cause of action to 
, 
4. 
remedy invasions of fundamental liberties the origins of which 
antedated the Constitution, the right not to be discharged from 
employment on a discriminatory basis was a modern innovation that 
did not demand the same kind of protection. On this basis he . 
distinguished those cases in the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere 
where an implied cause of action had been recognized. 
Judge Goldber , joined by Chief Judge Brown, dissented -
on the basis of his opinion for the panel. He commented, "While 
recognizing that constitutional attri~ion may be the benchmark of 
the 1970's, I would leave it for the Supreme Court to place the I 
mark of Cain on Bivens' heretofore unblemished brow." 
CONTENTIONS: Petitioner argues that the decision below 
is in conflict with decisions of five circuits, one of which was 
subsequent to it, and is contrary to dicta expressed in four 
other circuits. See Turpin v. Mailet, No. 77-7345 (2d Cir. Jun. 
5, 1978); Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 
1977), vacated and remanded, 46 U.S.L.W. 3792 (U.S. Jun. 26, 
1978); Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353 
(9th Cir. 1978); States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 
1146 (4th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 
457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972); cf. De1lums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3803 (U.S. Jul. 3, 
1978); McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 434 u.s. 966 (1977); Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical Abstracts 
Service, 521 F.2d 139Z (6th Cir. 1975); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. 
United States, 515 u.s. 926 (lOth Cir. 1975). But cf. Kostka v. 
5. 
~' 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977). Petitioner also contends that 
=.,. 
I 
the----use o_f _the Cort v. Ash analysis wa~ inap ropriate, as here - ~ ----- --
the Fifth Amendment requires implication of a remedy to vindicate ---- --......__ -what would otherwise be an unremedied wrong. The caseload 
management argument is attacked as not borr: out by the lower 
court's experience with Bivens. Finally, petitioner asserts that 
staff hiring is not the kind of activity recognized by previous 
decisions of this Court as falling within the protection of the 
Speech or Debate Clause. 
DISCUSSION: Although it does not appear that any other 
circuit has dealt with the question whether Bivens applies to the 
\' 
~ equal protection branch of the Fifth Amendment's due process 
guaranty, the fact remains that every other circuit faced with 
)
the problem has implied a cause of action with respect to ~r 
assertions of due process rights. Before the recognition in 
--c------Monroe v. Pape, 365 u.s. 167 (1961), of section 1983 as an all 
purpose cause of action against state officials, the decisions of 
this Court regularly assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment 
provided a cause of action against its violations. See, e.g., Ex 
parte Young, 209 u.s. 123 (1908). These decisions would suggest 
( 
that a similar cause of action could be implied from the due 
process guaranty of the Fifth Amendment. The opinion in Bolling 
v. Sharpe, 347 u.s. 497 (1954), which held that race 
discrimination perpetuated by the federal government violates the 
Fifth Amendment, does not refer to a statutory basis for the 
cause of action, and it seems fair to infer the Court believe~ the 
a. 
Constitution itself provided the right to sue. Indirect support 
for this proposition can be found in the statement in Butz v. 
Economou, 46 U.S.L.W. 4952, 4959 (U.S. Jun. 29, 1978), that "To 
create a system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely 
the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal 
officials is to stand the constitutional design on its head." 
Whatever the merits of the dispute, the question decided 
by the court below is an important one about which a substantial 
conflict exists. The federal courts have had considerable 
experience with Bivens suits in the last seven years, and the 
time seems ripe to reconsider the rationale of that decision and 
determine whether it warrants extension. The decision below 
not limited to sex discrimination suits against Congressmen: 
would apply to race discrimination, unwarranted incarceration 
takings of property, and violations of the other individual 
liberties protected specifically by the Fifth Amendment, and 
all federal defendants against whom a statutory cause of 
has not been created. 
The subsidiary questions of separation of powers, Speech 
or Debate Clause immunity, and the application of Butz to 
Congressmen all seem independently certworthy, as none of the 
decisions of this Court appear to be directly on point. 
A response has not been filed, and should be called for 
before a decision is made as to granting cert. At this stage, 
however, all the indications of certworthiness are present. 
There is no response. 
8/25/78 Stephan opns in petn 
t 
• - ~ - -- - • • .. • • • • • • • • • 0 • • .. • 0 • • 1 - """ • 0 • 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 





v Burger, Ch. J... ........ . . . . . . . . . . .. 
~ Brennan, J ........................... . 
Stewart, J ......................... . V.'. 






N POST DIS AFF 
MERITS 
REV AFF 
Marshall, J .................... ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . 
Blackmun, J ................... V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .... . 
Powell, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... "'- .... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . 
../ Rehnquist, J.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . 




N 78-507 : 0. 
NOT VOTING 
••••••• 0 •• 0 •••• •••••••• 0. 0 •• 0 ••• 0. 0. 0 •• ••••••••••• 0 ••••• 0 0 •• 0 • ••••••• 0 •• 0 •• 0 ••••••••• 
LFP/lab 2/~2/79 
To: Bruce Date: February 12, 1979 
From ·. ' ~~~--'ft.J.. ~ tt:.-1-~~ L.F.P., Jr. 
to/o ~ . .i~~ . . 
P~J- ~~ ... ·a~~~ 
~,.._z ~~' lok.. Jt,. • ..!#:.....LJ 
tJ c.; c. &.L '1 d..<..-~ 
No. 78-5072 Davis v. Passman -~ ~. 1 ~ :A} ,_.....,.~ ,t.~L'i4'<-'~•-t 
~'""-$/~~ 
~ s-tta. ... ~.J. c~~s- . 
At the time of this case, respondent Passman was a .J. • • 
«1-~c 4Con"-
Congressman (I am not sure that he still is). Petitioner ~ ~ , 
'-'"~ 
was his deputy administrative assistant, having served only~
a few months, but apparently was employed with the view to ~ 
CJ:It;-
succeedinq the administrative assistant whose retirement ~4~~~~ 
date was imminent. ~ 
t 0 '-AtL 
Respondent terminated her employment, giving her ' LrTT 
bf'· notice in a rather indiscrete letter (see p. 4 of 
petitioner's brief) in which he stated that in view of the 
duties of the office he preferred to have a man. Petitioner 
brought suit, claiming sex discrimination in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment. She sought precuniary damages, not 
just a right to Procedural due process before beinq relieved 
of her job. 
Title VII was extended to civil service employees 
of the federal government only in 1972, but apparently the 
Amendment embracinq civil servants explicitly excluded staff 
personnel of Congressmen. The briefs indicate that they 
•.. ----------~.~-----------------------~-----~~------------------------~------~·~-~-
2. 
were viewed as "noncompetitive" federal employees. (I have 
not checked the Amendment to Title VII or the requlations, 
and did not focus clearly on these as I read the briefs.) 
In any event, it seems to be conceded that 
petitioner could look to no statute or regulation giving her 
a cause of action. She therefore relied on a Bivens type of 
implied cause of action from the Fifth Amendment. 
CA 5, en bane, held by a 12 to 2 vote that a ( 
Bivens cause of action for damages cannot be implied from 
the Fifth Amendment. 
Several rationales were identified, including an 
interesting one by Judge Roney who concluded that a 
constitutional cause of action for money damages may be 
implied only where the damage remedy is rooted in 
preconstitutionj~J "notions of tort law". 
Respondent, in addition to relying on the various 
opinions of CA 5, argues fundamentally that Bivens should 
not be extended beyond the Fourth Amendment. 
Perhaps the strongest argument, and one that has 
considerable appeal to me, is that Congress deliberately 
intended that its members should retain control over their 
personal staffs. The history of the Amendment to Title VII 
should be examined with this in view. It is not easy to 
believe that Congress voluntarily would foreclose the right 
'. 
of its members to exercise virtually absolute control over 
the "hiring and firing" of their office personnel. The 
reasons for this are easy to perceive, not the least is the 
type of loyalty an elected official needs in the 
relationships with constituents. 
Of course, if the Constitution confers a right to 
damages for sex discrimination, Conqress could not legislate 
an exemption for itself unless the Speech or Debate Clause 
protects its members. Respondent relies on that Clause, 
althouqh I find considerable difficulty in stretching it to 
cover this case. I am presently unpersuaded, however, that 
the Constitution requires us to recognize a Bivens type 
cause of action where Congress itself has not - as it did in 






The case is one of considerable importance, an~ltw~-~~~ 
certainly of special interest "on the Hill". I therefore d-;; -z;:;_--· 
want a memorandum from you. If I am on the right track in ~ 
what I have indicated above, the memorandum can focus ~ 
primarily in support of that view. I do not foreclos~, of~ 






BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: Davis v. Passman, No. 78-5072 
DATE: February 24, 1979 
The principal issue in this case appears to be the 
propriety of implying a damages remedy for acts of employment 
discrimination by a Congressman. The Speech or Debate Clause 
question does not seem substantial, and I will not discuss it 
here. My own impression is that it would be inappropriate to 
extend Bivens to this case, but that to reach this result some 
revision of the criteria expressed in that case will be 
necessary. 
' 2. 
The power of a federal court to imply a damages remedy 
in situations such as this was settled in Bivens; the propriety 
of exercising that power is the issue here. Justice Brennan's 
opinion for the Court in Bivens contains the following discussion 
of the point: 
"Finally, we cannot accept respondents' formulation 
of the question as whether the availability of 
money damages is necessary to enforce the Fourth 
Amendment. For we have here no explicit 
congressional declaration that persons injured by a 
federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment 
may not recover money damages from the agents, but 
must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally 
effective in the view of Congress. The question is 
f he can demonstrate an 
merely whether petitioner,@ 
injury consequent upon the violation by federal 
agents of his Fourth Amendment rights, is entitled 
to redress his injury through a particular remedial 
mechanism normally available in the federal courts. 
Cf. J •. I . • Ca9e Co. v. Borak, 377 u.s. 426, 433 
(1964); Jaco6s v. United States, 290 u.s. 13, 16 
(1933)." Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics 
Agents, 403 · u.s. 388,397 (1971). 
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion is more elaborate with 
respect to this question. He begins his analysis with the 
following general observation: 
"[I]t must also be recognized that the Bill of 
Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the 
interests of the individual in the face of the 
popular will as expressed in legislative 
majorities; at the very least, it strikes me as no 
more appropriate to await express congressional 
authorization of traditional judicial relief with 
regard to these legal interests than with respect 
to interests protected by federal statutes. 
"The question then, is, as I see it, whether 
compensatory relief is 'necessary' or 'appropriate' 
to the vindication of the interest asserted. Cf. 
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, •••• In resolving that 
question, it seems to me that the range of policy 
considerations we may take into account is at least 
as broad as the range of those a legislature would 
consider with respect to an express statutory 
authorization of a traditional remedy." Id~, at 
407. 
3. 
The considerations militating in favor of implying a remedy were, 
in Justice Harlan's view, the familiarity of the courts with 
litigation affecting the kinds of interests involved in Fourth 
Arnendent claims, the danger that state law limitations will 
undercut effective relief, and the fact that damages often will 
be the only available remedy. The only countervailing policy he 
perceived, docket size, was insufficient to outweigh these 
considerations. 
Summarizing these opinions, a fair reading of Justice 
Brennan's position would be that a damages remedy always will be 
implied for the violation of a constitutional right, absent 
creation by Congress of an acceptable alternative remedy. 
Justice Harlan's position would look to a wider range of 
considerations, but a key factor would be whether the individual 
in the particular case could otherwise receive adequate relief 
for the injury suffered. 
The problem with both these approaches, as I perceive 
it, is the exclusive focus on the individual's power to rectify 
particular injuries. They overlook the situation where Congress 
has preempted a field by enacting a comprehensive remedial 
scheme, but in so doing has chosen to leave a small class of 
individuals without effective relief. In more general terms, 
both approaches overlook the context in which the claim is 
asserted and instead look only at the interest asserted by the 
victim of the constitutional violation. 
4. 
The Fourth Amendment and the rights it protects 
traditionally have been the almost exclusive concern of the 
courts. The exclusionary rule, as fashioned in Weeks and 
extended to the States in Mapp, is the product of judicial 
innovation, in large part because of the failure of legislative 
bodies to provide alternative means of guarding the interests 
implicated by the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 482-489 (1976) (discussing relationship between the 
general social purposes of the Fourth Amendment and the 
judicially-created remedy of exclusionary rule). Perhaps because 
of the inherent conflict between the Fourth Amendment and law 
enforcement, neither legislatures nor members of the executive 
branches of federal, state, and local governments have taken on 
their own effective steps to ensure the respect for individual 
dignity and privacy the Fourth Amendment was meant to guarantee. 
Bivens is a natural product of judicial activism in an area where 
constitutional rights have been neglected by the other branches 
of government. Cf. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-- Judges Who 
Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 787 (1963). 
Justice Harlan implied as much when he observed in eyiven~ that 
"the judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the 
vindication of constitutional interests such as those embraced by 
the Fourth Amendment." 403 u.s., at 407. 
It is not as clear that the judiciary has a particular 
responsibilty to assure the vindication of the constitutional 
interests involved in employment discrimination. Unlike the 
Fourth Amendment area, when congressional action has been 
5. 
piecemeal (limited to Title III of the Safe Streets Act, as far 
as I am aware), Congress has taken the laboring oar in regulating 
employment discrimination. Sections 1981, 1983, and Title VII 
together constitute a comprehensive scheme for adressing this 
problem, with the balancing and tradeoffs such a scheme entails. 
These measures are part of an even larger program involving the 
prohibition of racial and gender-based discrimination in all 
facets of life. 
Judicial implication of remedies in an area Congress 
already has occupied would upset judgments made and compromises 
struck. In this case, Congress has chosen not to provide a 
damages remedy for certain congressional staff, in spite of its 
obvious concern with the general problem of employment 
discrimination and the vigorous steps it has taken to eradicate 
the phenomenon in other areas. The implication of a remedy would 
reverse that decision. The fact that Congress does not appear to 
have documented the reasons for its decision on this point should 
be immaterial. Perhaps the exemption resulted from a compromise, 
or perhaps the unseemliness of taking individual congressmen to 
court for his personal hiring decisions seemed too obvious for 
explanation. Perhaps rank hypocrisy is involved. My guess is 
that all of these motives and more could be attributed to various 
individual members. The point is that Congress clearly has made 
a decision as to this issue, and the application of Bivens here 
would reverse it. A similar criticism could not be made with 
respect to the facts in Bivens. 
The obvious objection to this approach is that it leaves 
6. 
some individuals whose rights have been violated without any 
effective relief. One could respond that equitable relief still 
might be available, but I am not sure you would wish to go that 
far. Holding a Congressman in contempt for refusing to rehire a 
staff person is even more unpalatable than holding him liable in 
damages. A better answer, I think, is that not every violation 
of the constitution can or should be remedied by a federal court. 
On the facts of this case, it is not at all clear that a damages 
award will be as effective a deterrent of employment 
discrimination as publicity and attendant political retaliation. 
(It is interesting to note that Passman is now an ex-Congressman, 
although his criminal involvement in the Koreagate scandal may 
have had something to do with that). Furthermore, state remedies 
might still be available, although as the relevant State often 
will be the District of Columbia I am not sure this is a 
satisfactory answer. 
In sum, what I recommend is a narrower conception of the 
responsibilities of the federal judiciary than that articulated 
in Bivens. Rather than assuming that the judiciary has a free 
rein to craft a remedy for every invasion of a federally-
protected interest, with express congressional direction limiting 
the choice of remedy but not the existence of a remedy vel · non, I 
think the Court should look first to determine whether the rights 
asserted belong to a class traditionally relegated to judicial 
protection or rather fall within the scope of a general statutory 
regulatory program. If the rights fall within a latter category, 
I think the Court should be very reluctant to upset whatever 
7. 
legislative judgments went into the decision not to extend the 
general legislative program to the particular claim asserted. As 
long as the exemption itself does not constitute a form of 
invidious discrimination, it should be honored. 
This approach would amount to a retrenchment from 
Bivens, although it would preserve what I believe is fundamental 
in that decision. I think the retrenchment is warranted as a 
matter of policy, and I do not believe there is any decision of 
the Court that you have joined which would stand in the way. The 
result in this case would be consistent with the spirit, if not 
the letter, of Brown v. ~' 425 u.s. 820 (1976), insofar as the 
latter decision recognizes Congress meant the 1972 amendment of 
Title VII to be the exclusive remedy for federal employees 
claiming employment discrimination. 
78-5072 DAVIS v. PASSMAN Argued 2/27/79 
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SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: Davis v. Passman, No. 78-5072 
DATE: February 28, 1979 
Judge Jones, in the court below, argued that principles 
of separation of powers, rather than the interpretation of 
Bivens, should govern the outcome of this case. See app. 57-59. 
I do not think the issue can be whether the dispute here involves 
a "political question", the doctrine under which separation of 
powers problems traditionally have been handled. See United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-697 (1974)~ Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)~ Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
2. 
(1962); Pacific States · Tel. & Tel~ Co. v. Oregqn, 223 u.s. 118 
(1912). If a case fell within the scope of that doctrine, a 
federal court could not entertain it regardless of Congress' 
explicit creation of jurisdiction. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 
Cranch 137 (1803). Yet here Congress clearly could enact a 
statute giving federal courts jurisdiction to adjudicate 
controversies of this sort. For this reason, I believe the 
separation-of-powers doctrine does not apply to this case of its 
own force. 
This does not mean, however, than separation-of-powers 
considerations have no role to play in applying Bivens, as I 
should have indicated in my memorandum to you. The Court can and 
should consider these principles in determining whether to imply 
a damages remedy. The argument goes more or less like this: 
falling into "the range of policy considerations [the Court] may 
take into account," Bivens, at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring), is 
the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other branches of government. Cf. United States v. Nixon, suera. 
In a case where the logic of Bivens otherwise would point toward 
implication of a damages remedy, the Court should take into 
account the special circumstance that the dispute involves the 
workings of a coordinate branch of government. This 
consideration outweighs the grounds for implying an action. 
An opinion written along these lines would be much 
narrower than what I outlined to you earlier. In essence the 
decision would be confined to causes · of actions such as this one, 
and would not disturb the application of Bivens to the Fifth or 
3. 
Fourteenth Amendments generally. At bottom the same point would 
have to be made: There are some deprivations of constitutional 
rights for which the federal courts may not provide a remedy. 
The political question cases also are relevant to this point, as 
they stand for the proposition that the Constitution does deprive 
the federal courts of some power to redress constitutional 
violations. 
To my mind, the approach I outlined in my earlier 
memorandum is more satisfying as a matter of abstract logic. I 
am a bit troubled by the idea, necessarily implied by the 
argument outlined above, that the existence of a remedy for 
violations of one's rights depends to some extent on who the 
defendant is. I also would prefer to see a broader principle 
expressed that would contain Bivens, as I think the wisdom of 
judicial implication of damages remedies is not as clear as 
perhaps seemed a decade ago. What seems attractive as a matter 
of logic, however, may be neither practical nor acceptable to a 
majority of the Court. In any prevent, I apologize for not 
addressing these arguments earlier. 
I 
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Dear Chief: 
I shall try my hand at the opinion for the 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.;§n.prtmt Qfourl of tlrt ~tt~ $it r~ 
~ufringhtn. ~. <!J. 2IT,SJ}~~ 
THE cHIEF .;usTICE March 6, 1979 
Re: 78-5072 - Davis v. Passman 
MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
I will undertake to prepare a dissent in this case. 
Regards, 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Just 1-:le R~hnquist. 
Mr . Just icC~ Stevens 
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Bivens v. Si:r Unknown .\·arned Agents of the Federal Bu-
reau of l\'arcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), held that a "cause of 
action for damages" arises under the Constitution when 
Fourth Amendment rights are violated. The issue presented 
for decision in this case is whether a cause of action and a 
damages remedy can also be implied directly under the Con-
stitution when the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
~_ I(. OJI"~ ment is violated. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
r 11 • en bane, concluded that "no civil action for damages'' can be 
&AAA-t\AA, ~ 
1 
thus implied. 571 F. 2d 793. 801 (1978). We granted cer-
fl,/1. 'I ~NC tiorari,- U.S.- (1978), and we now reverse. 
6WI ~~ ____ .1 I 
IJ!fC'~ ,f ~~r-~ At the time this case commenced. respondent Otto E. 
• .JJ . t..tU 14 Passman was a l'"nited States Congressman from the Fifth 
1 J 111\V"- f \ Congressional District of Louisiana.' On February 1, 1974. 
Passman hired petitioner Shirley Davis as a deputy adminis-
trative assistant.~ Passman subsequently terminated her 
~~ Y :~··· L~ 1 Pa,;~man was dE'fE'ated in thr 19ifi primary E'IE'ction, and hi,.; tenure !n 
' 1../ \~officr rnd!'d .Tatmar~· 3, 1977. 
~~~r l L. ~In lwr complaint. DaviH avrr::; that hE'r "Halary wa:,; $18,000.00 per year 
-1" , o~ ~ with thl' expretation of a promotion to dE>h·ndant ':,; administrative a:,;::;'::;tant 
}.. \ at a ~alar~· o·f $:32,000.00 per year upon thr imminE'nt retirE'mrn( of 
, M v.~ defE'ndant '~ currC'nt admini;;trativt' aH:sbtant ." App .. at 4. 
J, ~ Davi::; wa::< nut hirE'd through the rompPtitive srrvire. S('(• 2 U. S. C. 
\ , ~\~ § 92. ( AA ~ 
()-J'- J~ ~ W' ~~··' 
~~ ~ ~~~M~ ~~ 
'(IJ.Jf. w. ~ ~ 0 ~ '1/V\ ..}.d eo-
IAJN'-~ ~ ~ C),. J.,..~ ~~ . (\ (\ 
I o-.~~ }... ~ \,<M~ ~ ..-:x 
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employment, effective July 31. 1974, writing Davis that, 
although "you are able. energetic and a very hard worker, ... 
I concluded that it was essential that the understudy to my 
Administrative Assistant be a man." 3 App .. at 6. 
Davis brought suit in the United States District Court for 
8 The full test of Pnl'~man's letter is as follows: 
"Dear Mrs. Davis: 
"My Washington staff joins me in sa~·ing that wr miss you very much. 
But, in all probability, inward!~· they all agree that I wa~ doing you an 
injusticr b~· asking ~·ou to as:;umr a reHpon:;ibilit~· that was so trying and 
so hard that it would have taken all of the pblHure out of your work. 
I must be completely fair with you , so plra~e note the following: 
"You are able, energetic and a very hard worker. Certainly ~·ou com-
mand the respect of those with whom ~·ou work; however, on account of 
the unusually heavy work load in my Wa:;hington Office, and the diversity 
of the job, I concluded that it was e~:;ential that the understud~· to my 
Administrative As::;istant be a man. I believe you will agree with this 
conclusion. 
"It would be unfair to you for me to ask you to waste your talent 
and experiPnce in my Monroe officr because of the low salary that is 
available because of a junior position. Therefore, and so that your 
experience and talent rna~· be used to advantage in some organization in 
need of an extremely capablr secretary, I de:;ire that you be continued 
on the payroll at ~·our present salary through .July 31, 1974. This arrange-
ment gives you your full year's vacation of one month, plu:-; one additional 
month. May I further say that the work load in the Monroe office is· 
very limited, and since you would come in a~ a junior member of the· 
staff at ;;uch a low salary, it would actually be an offen:;e to you. 
"I know that secretaries with your ability are very much in demand in 
Monroe. If an additional letter of rrcommendation from me would be· 
advantageous to you, do not he~itatr to let me know. Again, a:;suring you 
that my Washington staff and your humble Congressman feel that the· 
contribution you made to our Wa:;hington office has helped all of us. 
"With best wishes, 
Sincerely, 
j::;j Otto E. Passman 
OTTO E. PASSMAN 
Member of Congress.'" 
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the Western District of Louisiana, alleging that Passman's 
conduct discriminated against her "on the basis of sex in 
violation of the United States Constitution and the Fifth 
Amendment thereto." !d., a.t 4. Davis sought damages in 
the form of backpa.y. /d., at 5.4 Jurisdiction for her suit was 
founded on 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a), which provides in per-
tinent part that federal "district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in contro· 
versy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 ... and arises 
under the Constitution ... of the United States." 
Passman moved to dismiss Davis' action for failure to state 
9, claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 
12 (b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that "the law affords no private 
right of action" for her claim." App., at 8. The District 
Court accepted this argument, ruling that Davis had "no 
private right of action." !d., at 9.6 A panel of the Court o{ 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 544 F. 2d 865 (1977). 
The panel concluded that a cause of action for damages arose 
directly under the Fifth Amendment; that, taking as true the 
allegations in Davis' complaint, Passman's conduct violated 
the Fifth Amendment; and that Passman's conduct was not 
shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution1 
Art. I, § 6, cl. 1,7 
4 Davis also sought equitable relief, a~ well as a promotion and salary 
increase. App., at 4-5. Since Pas~man i~ no longer a CongreH:sman, 
however, see fl. 1, supra, the:;e form~ of relief arc no longer available. 
5 Passman also argued that his allcgt>d conduct was "not violative of the 
Fifth Amendment to tht> Constitution," and that relief wa~ barred "by 
reason of the :sovereign immunity doctrine and the official immunity doc-
trine." App., at 8. 
6 The District Court al:;o ruled that, although "thr doctrines of ~OYereign 
and official immunity" did not just if~· dismi:;:sal of Davis' complaint, "the' 
di:;charge of plaintiff on alleged grounds of SPX discrimination b~· defrndant 
is not violative of the Fifth Amendment to thr Constitution." App., at 9. 
7 The panel abo held that, although sovereign immunity did not bar a; 
damages award against Pa,.;;;man individually, he was entitled at trial t8 
a defense of qualified immunity. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed the decision of the panel. The en bane Court did 
not reach the merits, nor discuss the application of the Speech 
or Debate Clause. The Court instead held that "no right of 
action may be implied from the Due Process Clause of the 
fifth amendment." 571 F. 2d, at 801. The Court reached 
this conclusion on the basis of the criteria that had been set 
out in Cart v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), for determining 
whether a private cause of action should be implied from a 
federal statute.8 Noting that Congress had failed to create a 
8 The criteria set out in Cart v. Ash. supra, are: 
"First, is the plaintiff 'one of the cla~s for whose especial bem•fit the 
statute was enacted,' Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 39 
(1916) (emphasis supplird)-that is. doe~ the statute create a federal 
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, i~ there any indicatiou of legisla-
tive inteut, explicit or implicit, rithcr to create such a remedy or to deny 
one? See, e. g., Nat:ional Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of 
Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458, 460 (1974) (Amtrak). Third, 
is it consistent with the undrrlying purpo~Ps of the legislative scheme to 
imply such a remed~· for the plaintiff? See, e. g., Amtrak, supra; Securi-
ties Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 423 (1975);. 
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134 (1964). And finally, is the cause of 
action one traditionally relrgated to state law, in an area basically the 
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to inJer a cause 
of action basrd solely on federal law? Ser Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 
647, 652 (1963); cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 434 (1964); 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 394-395 
(1971); id., at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment)." 422 U. S., 
at 78. 
The Court of Appeals had some difficulty applying these criteria to 
determine whrther a cause of action should be implied under the Constitu-
tion. It eventually concluded, howevrr, (1) that although "the fifth 
amendment right to due process certainly conferl:i a right upon Davis, the 
injury allrged here doel:i not infringe this right as directly as" the violation 
of the Fourth Amendment rights alleged in Bivens, 571 F. 2d, at 797; 
(2) that "[clongrr~sional rrmedial legislation for employmmt discrimi-
nation has carefully avoided creating a cause of action for money damages 
for one in Davis' position," id., at 798; (3) that, unlike violations of the 
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damages remedy for those in Davis' position , the Court also 
concluded that "the proposed damage remedy is not constitu-
tionally compelled" so that it was not necessary to "counter-
mand the clearly discernible will of Congress" and create such 
a remedy. 571 F. 2d, at 800. 
II 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, supra, federal agents had allegedly 
arrested and searched Bivens without probable cause. thereby 
subjecting him to great humiliation, embarrassment, and 
mental suffering. Bivens held that the Fourth Amendment 
guarantee against "unreasonable searches and seizures" was a 
constitutional right which Bivens could enforce through a 
private cause of action, and that a damages remedy was an 
appropriate form of redress. Last Term, Butz v. Economou, 
- U. S. - (1978) , reaffirmed this holding, stating that 
"the decision in Bivens ... established that a citizen suffer-
ing a compensable injury to a constitutionally protected 
interest could invoke the general federal question jurisdiction 
of the district courts to obtain an award of monetary damages 
against the responsible federal official." I d., at - . 
Today we hold that Bivens and Butz require reversal of the 
holding of the en bane Court of Appeals. Our inquiry pro-
ceeds in three stages. We hold first that, pretermitting the 
question whether respondent's conduct is shielded by the 
Speech or Debate Caluse, the right asserted by petitioner 
is justiciable; second, that petitioner has stated a cause of 
action which asserts this right; and third, that relief m 
damages constitutes an appropriate form of remedy. 
Fourth Amendment, "the breadth of the concept of due process indicates 
that the damage remedy sought will not be judicially manageable," id.,. 
at 799 ; and ( 4) that implying a cause of action under the Due Process 
Clause would create "the danger of deluging 'federal rourts with claims 
otherwise redre:;sable in state courts or adminb trative proceedings . . .. _,. 
/d .) at 800, 
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A 
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall 
be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law .... " In numerous decisions, this Court 
"has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment forbids the Federal Government from denying equal 
protection of the laws. E. g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 
426 U. S. 88, 100 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 93 
(1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 638 n. 2 
(1975); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (19M)." Vance 
v. Bradley, - U. S. -, - n. 1 (1979). "To withstand 
scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 'classifications by gender 
must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.' 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190. 197 (1976)." Califano v. 
Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 316-317 ( 1977) .9 
The Equal Protection Component of the Due Process Clause 
thus confers on petitioner a federal constitutional right to be 
free from gender discrimination which cannot meet these 
requirements.10 Respondent argues, however, that in this case 
such a right is nonjusticiable because judicial determination of 
the "important governmental objectives" served by gender-
9 Before it can be determined whrther petitioner's Fifth Amendment 
right has been violated, therefore, inquiry mm;t be undertaken into what 
"important governmental objectives," if any, arr ~erved by the gender-
based employment of congrel:isional Rtaff. See n. 20, infra. We express 
no views as to the outcome of thi;; inquiry. We note only that if such 
gender-based employment doe;; not serve "important governmental objec-
tives" or is not ";;ubstantially related to thr achirvrmrnt" of such objec-
tives, the requirements of the Fifth Amendment will have been violated. 
10 This right is personal ; it is petitioner, aftrr all, who mu;;t suffrr the 
effects of such di;;crimination. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, -
U.S.-,- n. 13 (1979); Mouongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 
148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893), 
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based employment of congressional staff will necessarily involve 
a "lack of respect due coordinate branches of government." 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 ( 1962). Respondent fears 
that if petitioner's right is enforced, "the judiciary soon will 
be dictating to Congressmen and Congresswomen how their 
legislative responsibilities should be performed in the sense 
that it will dictate by whom they should be performed." 
Brief for Respondent 22. 
We disagree. The Speech or Debate Clause of the Con-
stitution, Art. I, § 6, cl. 1. functions "to protect the integ-
rity of · the legislative process by insuring the independence 
of individual legislators." United States v. Brewster, 408 
U. S. 501, 507 (1972). It is a paradigm example of "a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [anJ 
issue to a coordinate political department." Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). A Congressman must of course be 
free to hire the staff necessary for him to function "within the 
'sphere of legitimate legislative activity.' " Eastla:nd v. 
United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491, 501 (1975). 
See Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 616-617 ( 1972). 
· If petitioner's employment was in fact of this nature. respond-
ent will be shielded with absolute immunity by the Clause, 
"not only from the consequences of litigation's results. but 
also from the burden of defending [himself].'' Dombrowski" 
v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85 ( 1967). But if respondent's con-
duct is not protected by the Clause, it will be because petition-
er's position was so unrelated to "the legislative process" that 
the institutional interests of the Congress as a coordinate 
department will not be impaired by judicial review of respond-
ent's liability for the termination of her employment. 
The en bane Court of Appeals did not decide whether 
respondent was shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause. We 
also intimate no view on that issue. '" e conclude only that 
if the Clause should not apply. the question whether respond-
ent's dismissal of petitioner violated her Fifth Am.enillnent 
78-5072-0PINION 
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rights would, as we stated in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 
486 (1969), 
"require no more than an interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. Such a determination falls within the traditional 
role accorded courts to interpret the law. and does not 
involve a 'lack of respect due [a] coordinate branch of 
government,' nor does it involve an 'illitial policy deter-
mination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.' 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, at 217." 395 U. S., at 
548-549. 
We hold, therefore, that if respondent's dismissal of petitioner 
was not within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity 
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, petitioner's claim 
sets forth a justiciable right. We inquire next whether peti-
tioner has a cause of action to assert this right. 
B 
It is clear that the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U. S. C. § 1331 (a) to consider petitioner's claim. Bell v. 
Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946). It is equally clear, and the 
en bane Court of Appeals so held. that the Fifth Amendment 
confers on petitioner a constitutional right to be free from 
illegal discrimination.11 Yet the Court of Appeals concluded 
that petitioner could not enforce this right because she lacked 
e. cause of action. The meaning of this missing "cause of 
action," however, is far from apparent. 
Almost half a. century ago Justice Cardozo rec0gnized that 
a "'cause of action' may mean one thing for one purpose and 
something different for another." United States v. Memphis 
11 The rE-straints of the Fifth Amendment rE-ach far enough to embrace 
the official actions of a CongrE>,.;~man in hiring and di,.;missing his em-
ployees. That re:,;pondent'R conduct may have lwE>n illegal does not ~ufficE' 
to transform it into merely private action. "[Plower, oncE' granted, does 
not disappenr like a magic gift when it is wrongfully used." Bivens-, 
supra, at 392. See Home Telephone and TeleflU¥pfh Co. v. Los An(leles. 
22.7 U.S. 278, 287-289 (]913)·. 
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Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 67-68 (1933).1" The phrase 
apparently became a legal term of art when the New York 
Code of 1848 abolished the distinction between actions at law 
and suits in equity and simply required a plaintiff to include 
in his complaint "[a] statement of the facts constituting the 
cause of action . . " 13 New York Code of Practice in Civil 
Actions § 120 (2) (1848). By the first third of the 20th 
eentury, however, the phrase had become so encrusted with 
do(·trinal complexity that the authors of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure eschewed it altogether, requiring only that a 
complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. Rule Civ. 
Proc. 8 (a). See Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, 
Inc., 133 F. 2d 187, 189 (CA2 1943). Nevertheless, courts and 
commentators have continued to use the phrase "cause of 
action" in the traditional sense established by the Codes to 
refer roughly to the alleged invasion of "recognized legal 
rightr." upon which a litigant bases his claim for relief. 14 
Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 
682, 693 (1949). 
12 See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 748 (1947); Arnold, 
The Code 'Cause of Action' Clarified by United States Supreme Court, 19 
A. B. A. J. 215 (1933). 
13 See Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 Yale L .. T. 817, 820 (1924); 
Blume, The Scope of a Civil Action, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 257 (1943). 
14 See, e. g., United States v. Employing Plasterers Association, 347 U. S. 
186 (1954); 2A Moore's Federal Practice ~f 8.13, at 1704-1705 ("Perhap~ 
it i~ not entirely accuratf' to- say, as one court ha:s said, that 'it is only 
necessary to state a claim in the pleadings ... and not a cause of action.' 
While the Rules have substituted 'claim' or 'claim for rrlief' in lieu of the 
older and troublesome term 'cause of action,' the pleading still must state 
a 'cause of action' in the sense that it mu:st show 'that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.' It i~ not enough to indicate merely that the plaintiff 
has a grievance but sufficient detail must be given :so that the defendant, 
and the court, can obtain a fair idea of what the plaintiff is complaining, 
and cnn see that here i:s ;;orne legal basis for recovery.'') (footnotes 
omitted). 
There was, of course, great controver:sy concerning the exact meaning 
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This is not the meaning of the "cause of action" which the 
Court of Appeals below refused to imply from the Fifth 
Amendment, howevm~, for the Court acknowledged that peti-
tioner had alleged on invasion of her constitutional right to 
be free from illegal discrimination.'" Instead the Court of 
Appeals appropriated the meaning of the phrase "cause of 
action" used in the many cases in which this Court has parsed 
congressional enactments to detf'rmine whether the rights and 
obligations so created could be judicially enforced by a par-
ticular "class of litigants." Cannon v. University of Chica{Jo, 
- U. S. -, - (1979). Securities Investor Protect'ion 
Corp. (SIPC) v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412 (1975), for example, 
held that although "Congress' primary purpose in ... cre-
ating the SIPC was ... the protection of investors." and 
although investors were thus "thf' intended beneficiaries of the 
[Securities Investor Protectionl Act rof 1970]," 84 Stat. 1636, 
15 U. S. C. § 78aaa et seq., investors nevertheless had no 
private cause of action judicially to compel SIPC "to commit 
its funds or otherwise to act for the protection" of investors. 
I d., at 418, 421. We held that under the Act only the 
Securities and Exchange Commission had a cause of action 
enabling it to invoke judicial authority to require SIPC to-
of the phrase "rau:-:e of action" in the Codr~. Ser ill .. at § 2.0o, p. 359 
n. 26; J. Pomeroy, Code Renwdie,; 406-·Hil (4th ed. 190-+) ; Wheaton, Thr 
Code 'Cau~e oJ Action': It~ Definition, 22 Com. L. Q. 1 (1906); Clark, 
supra n. 13, at 837. 
15 The Court of Appeals apparenlly found that petitionrr larkrd a 
"cau~e of action" in the sense that a ca11,.:r of adion wo11ld havP been 
~upplied by 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Chapman "· Jlouston U'Pljare Rio/it's 
Org., - U. S. - (1979), !wid earlier thi,.: Term that, altho11gh § 1!.}1:13 
~erves "to ensme that an individual I haH I a <':lll:<C of :i(·tion for violatio11~ 
of the Constitution," the ~tatute it:-:elf "dor;; not ~l'!'Ure and providr :Ill)' 
rights at all." !d., at -. Srction 19i':~, of <'OIIW:', providr;;: a can:-;r of 
action only for deprivation" of constitutio11al right~ that O('CIII' "under color· 
of any statute, ordi11ance, regulation, ru~tom, or u,.:age, of any StaJe ·or · 
Terr\tory," and thu~ has no application to this case, 
78-5072-0PINION 
DAVIS v. PASSMAN ll' 
perform its statutory obligations. On the other hand, Texa8 
& N. 0. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930), held 
that § 2 of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577, 45 
U. S. C. § 152, which provides that railroad employees be able 
to designate representatives "without interference, influence, 
or coercion," did not confer "merely an abstract right," but 
was judicially enforceable through a private ·cause of action.10 
/d., at 558, 567-568. 
In cases such as these, the question is which class of liti-
gants may enforce in court legislatively created rights or 
obligations. If a litigant is an appropriate party to invoke 
the power of the courts, it is said that he has a "cause of 
action" under the statute, and that this cause of action is a 
necessary element of his "claim.n So understood, the question 
whether a litigant has a "cause of action" is analytically 
distinct and prior to the question of what relief. if any, a 
litigant may be entitled to receive. The concept of a "cause 
of action" is employed specifically to determine who may 
judicially enforce the statutory rights or obligations.17 
16 Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Ra'iZ.way Cle1·ks, supra, is now understood as· 
having implied a "cause of action" although the opinion ittie!f did not use· 
the phrase. See Cannon v. University of Chicago. supra, at- n. 13. 
17 Thus it may be said that jurisdiction i~ a que~tion of whether a federal' 
court has the power, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, 
to hear a case, see Mansfield. Cold'water & Lake Michigan Ry. Co. v. 
Swain, 111 U. S. 379, 384 (1884) ; Montana-Dakota Utilities Co . v. 
N orthwestem P·ublic Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 249 (1951); standing is 
a qu'estion of whether a plaintiff is sufficiently ad\'ersary to a defendant 
to create an Art. III case or controver~y, or at least to overcome pruden-
tial limitations on federal court jurisdiction, see Warth v. Seldin , 422'. 
U. S. 490, 498 (1975); cause of action is a question of whether a particu-
lar plaintiff is a member of the clatis of litigants that may, as a matter· 
of law, appropriately invoke the power of the court; and relief is a ques-
tion of the various remedies a federal court may make a\·ailable. A 
plaintiff may have a cause of action even though he be entitled to no· 
relief a.t all, as,, for exa~le;. whldl a defendant in a slllli.t fot da.nw~es iii; 
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It is in this sense that the Court of Appeals concluded that 
petitioner lacked a cause of action. The Court of Appeals 
reached this conclusion through the application of the criteria 
set out in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975). for ascertaining 
whether a private cause of action may be implied from "a 
statute not expressly providing one." ld., at 78.18 The Court 
of Appeals used these criteria to determine that those in 
petitioner's position should not be able to enforce the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause, and that petitioner there-
fore had no cause of action under the Amendment. · This was 
error, for the question of who may enforce a statutory right is 
fundamentally different than the question of who may enforce· 
a right that is protected by the Constitution. 
clothed with absolute immunity. See St'Ump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349' 
(1978). 
The Court of Appeals appeared to confuse the quf'stion of whether peti-
tioner had standing with the question of whf'tlwr she:> had asserted a proper 
cause of action. See Natiorw.l Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Asso-
ciation of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 465 n. 13 (1974). Although 
the Court acknowledged the existence of petitioner's constitutional right, 
571 F. 2d, at 797-798, it concluded that she had no cause of action in 
part because "the injury allegc:>d here does not infringe this right as 
directly as the injury inflicted in the unreasonable search of Webster 
.Bivens offended the fourth amendment." !d., at 797. The nature of 
petitioner's injury, however, is relevant to the determination of whether 
she has "alleged ;;uch a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy 
as to assure that concrete adversenes,; which sharpens the presentation of 
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of diffi-
cult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr. 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). 
And under the criteria we have :set out, petitioner clearly ha;; ~tanding to· 
bring this suit. If the allegations of her complaint are taken to be true, 
she has shown that ;;he "personally has suffered some actual or threatened· · 
injury as a result of the putative illegal conduct of the defendant."-
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood. - U. S. -, - (1979). 
Whether petitioner has at:serted a cause of action, however, depends not 
on the quality or extent of her injury, but on whether the class of litigants 
of which petitioner is a member may use the courts to enforce the right 
at iEsue. The focus must therefore be on the nature of the right peti--
ticiner a~serts. 
18 See n. 8, s'Upra, 
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Statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress, 
and it is entirely appropriate for Congress, in creating these 
rights and obligations, to determine in addition who may 
enforce them and in what manner. For example, statutory 
rights and obligations are often embedded in complex regula-
tory schemes, so that if they are not enforced through private 
causes of action, they may nevertheless be enforced through 
alternative mechanisms, such as criminal prosecut:ons, see 
Cart v. Ash, supra, or other public causes of actions. See 
S "Jcurities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, supra; Na-
tional Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of 
Railroad Passengers, supra, at 457. In each case, however, 
the question is the nature of the legislative intent informing 
a specific statute, and Cart set out the criteria through which 
this intent could be discerned. 
The Constitution, on the other hand, does not "partake of 
the prolixity of a legal code." M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 
Wheat. 316, 407 (1819). It speaks instead with a majestic 
simplicity. One of "its important objects," ibid., is the desig-
nation of rights. And in "its great outlines," ibid., the 
judicia.ry is clearly discernible as the primary means through 
which these rights may be enforced. As James Madison 
stated when he presented the Bill of Rights to the Congress: 
"If [these rights] are incorporated into the Constitution, 
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves 
in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they 
will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assump-
tion of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will 
be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights 
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the dec-
laration of rights." 1 Annals of Congress 439 (Gales & 
Seaton , eds. 1834). 
At least in the absence of "a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate 
political department," Baker v. Carr, supra, at 217, we pre-
sume that justiciable constitutional rights are to be en-
78-5072-0PINION 
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forced through the courts. And. unless such rights are to 
become merely precatory, the class of those litigants who 
allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated. 
and who at the same time have no effective means other than 
the judiciary to enforce these rights. must be able to invoke 
the existing .i urisdiction of the courts for the protection of 
their justiciable constitutional rights. "The very essence of 
civil liberty," wrote Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), "certainly consists in the 
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, 
whenever he receives an injury." Traditionally, therefore, 
"it is the established practice for this Court to sustain the 
jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect 
rights safeguarded by the Constitution a.nd to restrain indi-
vidual state officers from doing what the Fourteenth Amend-
ment forbids the State to do." Bell v. Hood, supra, at 684. 
See Bivens, supra, at 400 (Harlan, J. , concurring in judg-
ment). Indeed, this Court has already settled that a cause 
of action may be implied directly under the Equal Protection 
Component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment in favor of those who seek to enforce this constitutional 
right.19 The plaintiffs in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 
(1954). for example, claimed that they had been refused 
admission into certain public schools in the District of Colum-
bia solely on account of their race, . They rested their suit 
directly on the Fifth Amendment and on the general federal 
question jurisdiction of the district courts, 28 U. S. C. § 1331.. 
·The District Court dismissed their complaint for failure "to· 
state a claim upon which relief can be gra.nted." Fed. Rule 
Civ. Proc. 12 (b)( 6). This Court reversed. Plaintiffs were· 
clearly the appropriate parties to bring such a suit, and this 
19 Jacobs v. Uuited States, 290 U. S. 13 (1933) , held that a plaintiff who 
alleged that his proper~· had been taken by the Unit ed State::> for public 
use without just compensation could bring suit directly under the Fifth: 
Amendment, 
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Court held that equitable relief should be made available. 
349 u.s. 294 (1955). 
Like the plaintifl"s in Bolling v. Sharpe, supra, petitioner 
rests her claim directly on the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. She claims that her rights under the 
Amendment have been violated, and that she has no efl"ective 
means other than the judiciary to vindicate these rights.20 
2° Clausp 9 of Rule XLIII of the House of ReprPsPntativPs prohibits sex 
discrimination as part of thP CodP of Official Conduct of tlw House: 
"A Membf'r. official or Pmployep of tlw Hou~c of Repre~entative~ shall 
not dischargr or refusE' to hirP any individual, or othPrwisP discriminate 
ngainst any individual with rPsppct to compen~ation, tprm~, conditions, or 
priviiPgrs of employmPnt, because of such individual'~ race, color, religion , 
sex, or national origin:" 
Clause 9 was adopted on .January 14, 1975, ser 121 Con~. Rec. 22, 
approximatp)y six months aftrr petitionpr'~ discharge. In 1977 the House 
Commi~sion on Administratiw Review (thr "ObE>y Commi~sion") termrd 
"the anti-discrimination provisions of Rule XLIII ... all but unenforce-
able." Commission on Administrative Review, Recommendations and 
Rationales Concrrning Administrative Units and Work Mana11:ement, 9.5th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 5:3 (Comm. Print. 1977). The Commission recommended 
tlw establishment of n Fair Employment Practice~ Panp) to provide ''On-
binding conciliation in cases of alleged violations of Clause 9. See H . R 
Res . 766, 95th Cong., 1st S<•ss., § 504 (1977); Commission on Adminis-
trative ReviE-w, supm, at 52-53. This proposal was prevented from rearh-
ing the House floor, however, when the Hou~e defeated the Rule whirh 
would ha,·e governed consideration of the Obey Commission's resolution. 
See 123 Con g. Hec. H10819-28 (Oct. 12, 1977). 
On September 25, 1978, H. H. Re,: . 1380 was introduced railing for the 
implementation of Clause 9 through the rreation of "a House FAir 
Employment Relations BOlud, a House Fair Emnloyment H.elation~ 0ffirr. 
and procedures for hearing and settliPg rompiRints alleging viol~tions of 
Clnuse 9 of Hule XLIII .... " H . H Res. 1380. 95th Cone: .. 2d Bess., 
§ 2 ( 1978). H. H. Res. 1380 was referred to the Hou~e CommittPes on 
Admini•trntion rmd Rules. where it ilpp:uently l:u,guished. Se~ 124 Cong. 
Hec. H10697 (Sept. 25, 1978). The House fHiled to consider it before 
adjournment. 
There presently exists a "Oluntary House Fair Emnloyment Practices 
Agreement. Members of the House who have signed the Agreement elect 
n House Fair Employment Practices Committee, which has author.ity to 
. . 
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We conclude, therefore, that she is an appropriate pa.rty to 
invoke the general federal question jurisdiction of the District 
Court to seek relief. She has a cause of action under the 
Fifth Amendment.21 
Although petitioner has a cause of action. her complaint 
might nevertheless be dismissed under Rule 12 (b) ( 6) unless 
it can be determined that judicial relief is available. We 
therefore proceed to consider whether a damages remedy is an 
appropriate form of relief. 
c 
We approach this inquiry on the basis of established law. 
"[I]t is ... well settled that where legal rights have been 
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to 
sue for such invasion. federal courts may use any available 
remedy to make good the wrong done." Bell v. Hood, supra., 
at 684. Bivens, supra, holds that in appropriate circumstances 
a federal district court may provide relief in damages for the 
violation of constitutional rights if there are "no special factors 
counselling hesita.tion in the absence of affirmative action by 
Congress." !d., at 396. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at-. 
First, a damages remedy is surely appropriate in this case. 
"Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary 
remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." 
investigate cases of alleged discrimination among participating Members. 
The Committee has no enforcement powers. 
21 Five Courts of Appeals hnve implied cau~es of action directly under 
the Fifth Amendment. Sec Apton v. Wilson, 165 U. S. App. D. C. 22, 
506 F. 2d 83 (1974); Sullivan v. Mw·1Jhy. 156 U. S. App. D. C. 28, 478 
F. 2d 938 (197:3) ; United States ex rel. Moon'. v. Koelzer, 457 F. 2d 892 
(CA3 1972) ; Loe v. Armistead, 582 F. 2d 1291 (CA4 1978), eert. pending 
sub nom. Moffit v. Loe, No. 78-1260; State Marine Lines. Iuc . v. Slttdtz, 
498 F. 2d 1146 (CA4 1974): Green v. Ca1·lson, 581 F. 2d 669 (CA7 1978), 
cert. pendiu!!:, No. 78-1261; Jacobson v. Tahoe Region@ Planning Agency, 
566 F. 2d 1:353 (CA9 1977) , rever~ed in part and affirmed in purt on 
other grounds sub nom. Lake Tahoe Country · Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Ageru;y,- U. S. - (1979); Bennet v. Campbell, 564 
F. 2d 329 (CA9 1977) • 
7'8-50'i'2-0PINION 
DAVIS v. PASSMAN 17 
Bivens, supra, at 395. Relief in damages would be judicially 
manageable, for the case presents a focused remedial issue 
without difficult questions of valuation or causation. See id., 
at 409 (Harlan, J .. concurring in judgment). Litigation under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has given federal 
courts great experience evaluating claims for backpay due to 
illegal sex discrimination. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e- 5 (g). 
Moreover, since respondent is no longer a Congressman, see 
n. 1, supra, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement would 
be unavailing. And there are available no other alternative 
forms of relief. For Davis, as for Bivens, "it is damages or 
nothing." 22 Bivens, supra, at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
Second, there are in this case "no special factors counselling 
hesitation." "[F]ederal fiscal policy," for example, is not 
implicated. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 
311 (1947). And. although the defendant in this suit was, at 
the time petitioner's complaint was filed . a United States 
Congressman, we apply the principle that "legislators .. .. 
ought generally to be bound by [the law] as are ordinary 
persons." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 (1972). 
Cf. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 320 (1973). As Butz v. 
Economou stated only last Term: 
"Our system of jurisprudence rests on the assumption 
22 Respondent does not dispute petitioner's claim that she "has no cause 
of action nnd~.>r LouiHiana law." Brief for Petitioner 19. Sre 3 Empl. 
Prac. Guide (CCH) ,[ 23 ,541' (Ang. 19iR). And it is far from clear that 
a stat e court would have authority to effect a damages remedy against a 
United Stat<•s Congres~man for illegal actions in the course of his official 
conduct, ~.>ven if a. plaintiff's claim w~.>re grounded in the United Sta tes 
Constitution . See Ta1'ble's Ca..~e, 1~ Wall . 397 (1871) . Deference to 
state court adjudication in a case sueh n;.; thi:; would in any event not serve 
the purposes of f~.>drralh:im , since it involves the applica tion of the Fifth 
Amendment to n f~.>d eral officer in the rourse of his fedrral dntieR. It is 
therefore particulHrly appropriate that a federal court be the forum ..in 
which a damages remedy be awa.rdetl. 
18 
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that all individuals. whatf'ver their position in govern~ 
ment, are subject to fedf'rallaw: 
"'No man in this country is so high that he is above the 
law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance 
with impunity. All officers of the govermnent from the 
highest to the lowest are creatures of the law, and are 
bound to obey it.' 
"United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 220 (1882)." ~ 
U.S., at-. 
Third. there is in this case "no explicit congressional declara~ 
tion that persons" in petitioner's position injured by unconsti-
tutional federal f'mployment discrimination "may not recover 
money damages from" those responsible for the injury. 
Bivens, supra, at 397. (Emphasis supplied.) While such a 
declaration would not necessarily be binding on this Court, it 
would be a factor to consider in determining what relief is 
appropriate. The Court of Appeals apparently interpreted 
§ 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 86 Stat. 
103, 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-16, as an explicit congressional prohibi~ 
tion against judicial remedies for those in petitioner's position. 
When § 717 was added to Title VII to protect federal em~ 
ployees from discrimination. it failed to extend this protection 
to congressional employees such as petitioner who are not in 
the competitive service. 2" See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16 (a). 
There is no evidence, however, that Congress meant § 717 to 
foreclose alternative remedies available to those not covered 
by the statute. Such silence is far from "the clearly discern-
ible will of Congress" perceived by the Court of Appeals. 571 
F. 2d, at 800. And we are particularly loathe to read this 
silence as a prohibition of all judicial relief for respondent's al-
2a Since peti1 ioner wa.s not in thr competitive service, see n. 2 s·upra, 
tlw remedial provi~ions of § 717 of Title VII arc not available to h('r. In 
Bmwn v. Service~ Adrninistmtion, 425 U.S. 8:20 (1976), we held that the 
remedie~ provided by § 717 arc exclusive for those federal employees 
·covered by the statute. 
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leged violation of petitioner's Fifth Amendment right, because, 
so interpreted. ~ 717 would "practically ... deny the right." 
Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451. 457 (1904). The "right would 
be sacrificed or obliterated if it were without ... remedy .... " 
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 207 
( 1944). This interpretation of § 717 would raise serious ques-
tions concerning its constitutionality. See Brinkerhoff-Faris 
Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 682 (1930); cf. 
Johnson v. Robisoo, 415 U. S. 361, 366-367 (1974). In such 
cases "it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first 
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly pos-
sible by which the [constitutional] question [s] may be 
avoided." United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 
U. S. 363, 369 (1971). See National Labor Relations Board 
v. Catholic Bishops of Chicago, -- U. S. -, - (1979). 
We therefore do not interpret § 717 to foreclose the avail-
ability of a damages remedy to those in petitioner's position. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals appeared concerned that, if a 
damages remedy were made available to petitioner, the danger 
existed "of deluging the federal courts with claims ... .'r 
571 F. 2d. at 800. We do not perceive the potential for such 
a deluge. By virtue of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, a damages remedy 
is already available to redress injuries such as petitioner's 
when they occur under color of state law. Moreover. a plain-
tiff seeking a damages remedy under the Constitution must 
first demonstrate that his constitutional rights have been 
violated. We do not hold that every tort by a federal official 
may be redressed in damages. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373' 
U. S. 647 (1963). And, of course, were Congress to create 
equally effective alternative remedies, the need for damages 
relief might be obviated. See Bivens, supra, at 397. But 
perhaps the most fundamental answer to the concerns ex-
pressed by the Court of Appeals is that provided by Justice 
Harlan concurring in Biven: 




scarce these days. Nonetheless. when we automatically 
close the courthouse door solely on this basis. we im-
plicitly express a value judgment on the comparative 
importance of classes of legally protected interests. And 
current limitations upon the effective functioning of the 
courts arising from budgetary inadequacies should not be 
permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of other-
wise sound constitutional principles." 403 U. S., at 411. 
We conclude. therefore, that in this case. as in Bivens, if 
petitioner is able to prevail 011 the merits. she should be able 
to redress her injury in damages, a "remedial mechanism 
normally available in the federal courts." Bivens, supra, at 
397. 
III 
We hold today that th0 Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit. en bane, must be reversed because petitioner has a 
cause of action under the Fifth Amendment. and because her 
injury may be redressed by a damages remedy. The Court of 
Appeals did not consider. however. whether respondent's con-
duct was shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause of the 
Constitution. Accordingly. we do not reach this question. 
And, of course. we express no opinion as to the merits of 
petitioner's complaint. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
So ordered. 
~u:prtnu <!Jcu.d cf t~t ~nittb .®tm.ts 
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
April 13, 1979 
Re: No. 78-5072 - Shirley Davis v. Passman 
Dear Bill: 
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cc: The Conference 
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..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
April 20, 1979 
Re: No. 78-5072 - Davis v. Passman 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 




.JUSTICE w ... ..J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
~ttttt Q}ourt of tfrt ~tittb j;tatt.s 
~aslrhtghtn. ~. <!}. zogr~~ 
23 April 1979 
Re: No. 78-5072, Davis v. Passman 
Dear John, 
This is prompted by your observation at Friday's Conference 
that Passman might be in tension with the rationale voted by a 
major1ty as the basis for decision in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 
No. 78-680. I do not think this tension exists, and will 
attempt to explain why. 
The opinion in Hutchinson will make clear that it is 
preferable to reach at the outset Speech or Debate Clause 
issues. I agree with this conclusion, because a major purpose 
of the Speech or Debate Clause, where applicable, is to shield 
federal legislators with absolute immunity 11 not only from the 
consequences of litigation's results, but also from the burden 
of defending themselves ... Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 
85 (1967). 
In my proposed opinion in Passman, however, I in fact first 
reach the Speech or Debate C1ause issue, at least to the extent 
of concluding that Passman will not be shielded by the Clause 
if Davis' job was so unrelated to the legislative process that 
the institutional interests of the Congress as a coordinate 
department would not be impaired by judicial review of 
Passman's liability for the termination of her employment. Thus 
Passman will not be immune if Davis' position were the 
equivalent of that of a file clerk or messenger boy. The nature 
of the position that Davis held under Passman, however, is not 
established on the record before us. The District Court made no 
findings concerning this question, since it dismissed Davis' 
complaint on a 12 (b) (6) motion. The Fifth Circuit panel, 
although it reached the Speech or Debate issue, did not discuss 
the nature of Davis' employment, since it rested its holding on 
the more general ground that 11 representatives are not immune 
from inquiry into their decisions to dismiss staff members ... 
544 F.2d, at 880. And, of course, the en bane opinion of the 
Fifth Circuit did not even reach the Speech or Debate Clause 
issue. 
To decide whether Passman is shielded with immunity by the 
Speech or Debate Clause, therefore, the case will have to be 
remanded to the District Court for factual findings concerning 
the nature of Davis' employment. Thus not only is the burden of 
further litigation inevitable, but the cause of action question 
must necessarily be reached, since such litigation could not 
continue unless Davis' complaint stated a cause of action. In 
these circumstances to hold that the prospective rationale of 
Proxmire requires remanding the case to the Fifth Circuit for a 
determination of the Speech or Debate Clause issue not only 
would mean a waste of judicial resources, but also would have 
the ironic result of placing on Passman even greater and 
unnecessary burdens of litigation. 
I would be happy to make this reasoning more explicit in 
the proposed opinion, should that be thought necessary in light 
of Proxmire. 
Sincerely, 
~ ;_I '.· \. I ~_, p ~. 
W.J.B. Jr. 
Copies to Conference. 
CHAMeERS OF" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.iu.prttttt <!fmtri of tltt ~b ~tan~ 
~ufringLt~ ~. <!f. 21lc?Jt~ 
April 23, 1979 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: 78-5072 Davis v. Passman 
I will have a dissenting opinion out on this 
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.iUJfftutt C!Jourl of tlrt 'Pnittb ~aus 
'Jlfu!p:ttgton. ~. CIJ. 21lbt~~ 
23 April 1979 
Re: No. 78-5072, Davis v. Passman 
Dear John, 
This is prompted by your observation at Friday's Conference 
that Passman might be in tension with the rationale voted by a 
major1ty as the basis for decision in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 
No. 78-680. I do not think this tension exists, and will 
attempt to explain why. 
The opinion in Hutchinson will make clear that it is 
preferable to reach at the outset Speech or Debate Clause 
issues. I agree with this conclusion, because a major purpose 
of the Speech or Debate Clause, where applicable, is to shield 
federal legislators with absolute immunity 11 not only from the 
consequences of litigation's results, but also from the burden 
of defending themselves ... Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 
85 (1967). 
In my proposed opinion in Passman, however, I in fact first 
reach the Speech or Debate Clause issue, at least to the extent 
of concluding that Passman will not be shielded by the Clause 
if Davis' job was so unrelated to the legislative process that 
the institutional interests of the Congress as a coordinate 
department would not be impaired by judicial review of 
Passman's liability for the termination of her employment. Thus 
Passman will not be immune if Davis' position were the 
equivalent of that of a file clerk or messenger boy. The nature 
of the position that Davis held under Passman, however, is not 
established on the record before us. The District Court made no 
findings concerning this question, since it dismissed Davis' 
complaint on a 12 (b) (6) motion. The Fifth Circuit panel, 
although it reached the Speech or Debate issue, did not discuss 
the nature of Davis' employment, since it rested its holding on 
the more general ground that 11 representatives are not immune 
from inquiry into their decisions to dismiss staff members ... 
-
544 F.2d, at 880. And, of course, the en bane opinion of the 
Fifth Circuit did not even reach the Speech or Debate Clause 
issue. 
To decide whether Passman is shielded with immunity by the 
Speech or Debate Clause, therefore, the case will have to be 
remanded to the District Court for factual findings concerning 
the nature of Davis' employment. Thus not only is the burden of 
further litigation inevitable, but the cause of action question 
must necessarily be reached, since such litigation could not 
continue unless Davis' complaint stated a cause of action. In 
these circumstances to hold that the prospective rationale of 
Proxmire requires remanding the case to the Fifth Circuit for a 
determination of the Speech or Debate Clause issue not only 
would mean a waste of judicial resources, but also would have 
the ironic result of placing on Passman even greater and 
unnecessary burdens of litigation. 
I would be happy to make this reasoning more explicit in 
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To: The Chief Just1oe 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
Mr . Jus t i ce Stewart 
Mr . Justice White 
Mr . JU8t1ce Marshall 
Mr. Juat .1ce Blaokmun 
Mr . Just i ce Rehnquist 
Mr . Justice Stevens 
From: Kr . Just i ce Powell 
Ciroule.ted : 2 1 MAY 1979 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIT!If~: ---
No. 78-5072 
Shirley Davis, Petitioner, ! On Writ of Certiorari to the United 
v~ States Court of Appeals for the 
Otto E. Passman. Fifth Circuit, 
[Ma;v -, W79] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting, 
Although I join the opinion of THE CHIEF JusTICE, I write 
separately to emphasize that 110 prior decision of this Court 
justifies today's intrusion upon the legitimate powers of 
Members of Congress. 
The Court's analysis starts with the general proposition that 
"the judiciary is dearly discernible as the primary means 
through which [colistitutionai] fights may be enforced," ante; 
at 13. It leaps from this generalization, unexceptionable it• 
self, to the conclusion that individuals who have suffered an 
injury to a constitutionally protected interest, and who lack an 
"effective" alternative. ''must be able to invoke the existing 
jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable 
constitutional rights." Jd., at 14 (emphasis supplied). Apart 
from the dubious logic of this reasoning, I know of no prece-
dent of this Court that supports such an absolute statement 
of the federal judiciary's obiigation to entertain private suits 
that Congress has not authorized. On the contrary, I have 
thought it clear that federal courts must exercise a principled 
discretion when called upon to infer a private cause of action 
directly from the language of the Constitution. In the 
present case, for reasons well summarized by THl'J CHIEF Jus-" 
TICE, principles of comity and separation of powers should 
require a federal court to stay its hand. 
. To be sure, it has been clear-at least since Bivens v. SiX 
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971)-that, 
' l f I 
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in appropriate circumstances private causes of action may be 
inferred from provisions of the Constitution.1 But the exer-
cise of this responsibility involves discretion, alld a weighing 
of relevant concerns. As Mr. Justice Harlan observed in ad-
dressing this very point, a court should "take into account [a 
range of policy considerations] at least as broad as the range 
of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express 
statutory authorization of a traditional remedy." Bivens, 
supra, at 407. 
Among those policies that a court certainly should consider 
in deciding whether to imply a constitutional right of action is 
that of comity toward an equal and coordinate branch of 
government. 2 As Chief Justice Waite observed over a century 
ago, "One branch of government cannot encroach on the 
domain of another without danger. The safety of our institu-
tions depends in no sma.U degree on a strict observance of this 
salutary rule." Sinking Fund Cases, 9 Otto 700, 718 ( 1878). 
1 A court necessarily has wider latitude in interpreting the Constitution 
than it does in construing a statute, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 
316, 407 (1819). Moreover, the federal courts have a far greater responsi-
bility under the Constitution for the protection of those rights derived 
directly from it, than for the definition and enforcement of rights created 
solely by Congress. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 
U. S. 388,407 (1971) (Harlan, .T., <'OIH'Urring) . 
2 It is settled that where discretion exists, a variety of factors rooted in 
the Constitution may lead a fedrral court to refuse to entertain an other-
wise properly presented constitutional claim. See, e. g., Moore v. Sims,-
U.S.- (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. 
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); 
Younger v. Han·is, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Alabama Public Service Commis-
sion v. Southern R. C'o., 341 U. S. 341 ( 1951); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 
319 U. S. 157 (1943); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943); Rail-
road Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941); Hawks v. Hamill, 
288 U. S. 52 ( 1933). Traditionally the issue has arisen in the context of 
a federal court's exercise of itR equity powers with re~pect to the States. 
Concerns of comity similar to thoHe that govern our dealings with 1he 
States should come into play when we are asked to mterfere with the 
ftlnctioning of Congrrss. 
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Even where the authority of one branch over a matter is not 
exclusive, so that a federal court properly may accept jurisdic-
tion over the dispute, we have recognized that the principle of 
separation of powers continues to have force as a matter of 
policy. For example, in Uniteif States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
683 (1974), we held on the one hand that the question ·whether 
the President had a claim of privilege as to conversations with 
his advisers was an issue to be resolved by the judiciary, and 
on the other hand that separation-of-powers considerations-re-
quired the recognition of a qualified privilege. 
Whether or not the employment decisions of a Member of 
Congress fall within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause 
of the Constitution, a question the Court does not reach today,3 
it is clear that these decisions are bound up with the conduct of 
his duties. As THE CHIEF JusTICE observes, ante, a. Con-
gressman necessarily relies heavily on his personal staff in dis-
charging the duties of his office. Because of the nature of his 
office, he must rely to an extraordinary extent on the loyalty 
and compatibility of everyone who works for him. Cf. Elrod 
v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 377-388 ( 1976) (PowELL, J., dissent-
ing). A Congressman simply cannot perform his constitu-
tiona-l duties effectively, or serve his constituents properly, 
unless he is supported by a staff in which he has total 
· confidence. 
The foregoing would seem self-evident even if Congress had 
not indicated an intention to reserve to its Members the right 
to select, employ and discharge staff personnel without judicial 
interference. But Congress unmistakably has made clear its 
view on this subject. It took pains to exempt itself from the 
coverage of Title VIV Unless the Court is abandoning or 
3 As I would hold that peitioner does not have a cause of action against 
respondent, I also would not reach tlw speech or debate i::;::;uf'. 
1 Nor do I undf'r::;tand the 'Court':; statement that an express congres-
sional prohibition of judicial review of these deci~ions "would not neces-
sarily be binding on this Court." Ante, at 18. The Court repeatedly has 
accepted, as a general principle, the power of Congress to place limitations 
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modifying sub silentio our holding in Brown v. General Serv· 
ices Administration, 425 U. S. 820 (1976), that Title VII as 
amended "provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims 
of discriminl:\-tion in federal employment," id., at 835, the 
exemption from this statute for congressional employees should 
bar all judicial relief. 
In sum, the decision of the Court tod~y is not an exercise 
of principled discretion. It avoids our obligation to take into 
account the range of policy and constitutional considerations 
that we would expect a legislature to ponder in determining 
whether a particular remedy should be enacted. It fails to 
weigh the legitimate interests of Members of Congress. In~ 
deed, the decision simply ignores the constitutional doctrine 
of separl'l-tion of powers. In my view, the serious intrusion 
upon ' the authority of Members of Congress to choose and con-
trol their own personal staffs cannot be justified.5 
on the jurisdiction of federal courts. See, e. g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 
U. S. 182 (1943); Lauf v. E. G. 8kinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323 (·1938); 
Ex parte jl1cCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 440 
(1850). For a defense of the exclusive power of Congress to define the 
limits of federal jurisdiction, see Wechsler, The Oourts and the Constitu-
tion, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1004-1008 (1965). Brinkerhoff-Faris 
Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 682 (1930), cited by the Court 
as support for the authority of a federal court to reject legislative limita-
tions on its jurisdiction, is completely inapposite: The issue there involved 
the power of a state legislature to limit the means of vindicating federal 
rights. This is quite different from deciding which co-equal branch of the 
Federal Government has the authority to determine how these rights may 
be enforced. · 
5 The just ification the Court relies upon is the duty of federal courts 
to vindicate constitutional rights-a duty no one disputes. But it never 
has been thought that this duty required a blind exercise of judicial power 
without regard to other interests or constitutional principles. Indeed, it 
would not be surprising for Congres:; to consider today':; action unwarranted 
and to exercise its authority to reassert the proper balance betweet~ the 
legislative and judicial branches. If the reaction took the form of limiting 
the jurisdiction of federal courts, the effect conceivably could be to frus-
i;rate the vindication of rights properly protected by the Court. 
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Although I join the opinion f HE CHIEF JusTICE, I write 
separately to emphasize that no prior decision of this Court 
justifies today's intrusion upon the legitimate powers of 
Members of Congress. 
The Court's analysis starts with the general proposition that 
"the judiciary is clear1y discernible as the primary mean~ 
through which [constitutional] rights may be enforced," ante, 
at 13. It leaps from this generalization, unexceptionable it-
self, to the conclusion that individuals who have suffered an 
injury to a constitutionally protected interest, and who lack an 
11effective" alternative, "must be able to invoke the existing 
jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable 
constitutional rights." ld., at 14 (emphasis supplied). Apart 
from the dubious logic of this reasoning, I know of no prece-
dent of this Court that supports such an absolute statement 
of the federal judicia..ry's obligation to entertain private suits 
that Congress has not authorized. On the contrary, I have 
thought it clear that federal courts must exercise a principled 
discretion when called upon to infer a private cause of action 
directly from the language of the Constitution. In the 
present case, for reasons well summarized by THE CHIEF Jus-
TICE, principles of comity and separation of powers should 
require .a federal court to stay its hand. 
To be sure, it has been clear- at least since Bivens v. Six: 
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in appropriate circumstances private ca.uses of action may be 
inferred from provisions of the Constitution.1 But the exer .. 
cise of this responsibility involves discretion, and a weighing 
of relevant concerns. As Mr. Justice Harlan observed in ad-
dressing this very point, a court should "take into account [a 
range of policy considerations] at least as broad as the range 
of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express 
statutory authorization of a traditiona.l remedy." Bivens, 
supra, at 407. 
Among those policies that a court certainly should considet 
in deciding whether to imply a constitutional tight of action is 
that of comity toward an equal and coordinate branch of 
government.2 As Chief Justice Waite observed over a century 
1 A court necessarily has wider latitude in interpreting the Constitution 
than it does in construing a statute, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 
316, 407 (1819). Moreover, the federal courts have a far greater responsi-
bility under the Constitution for 1 he protection of those rights derived 
directly from it, than for the definition and enforcement of rights created 
solely by Congress. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 40~ 
U.S. 388,407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
2 It is settled that where discretion exists, a variety of factors rooted in 
the Constitution may lead a federal court to refuse to entertain an other-
wise properly presented constitutional claim. See, e. g., Moore v. Sims,-
U. S. - (1979); Tminor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. 
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pur-sue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Alabama Public Service Commis-
sion v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 
319 U. S. 157 (1943); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943); Rail• 
road Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Hawks v. Hamill, 
288 U. S. 52 ( 1933). Traditionally the issue has arisen in the context of 
a federal court's exercise of its equity powers with respect to the States. 
Concerns of comity similar to those that govern our dealings with the 
States should come into play when we are asked to interfere with the 
functioning of Congress. 
The Court ~uggests that because the Speech or Debate Clau:::e of th~ 
Constitution embodiet> a separatwn-of-powert> principle, the Corstitution 
afford~ no further protection to the prerogatives of Members of Congress. 
Ante, at 17. This assertion not only marks a striking departure from 
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ago, "One branch of government cannot encroach on the 
domain of another without danger. The safety of our institu-
tions depends in no small degree 'on a strict observance of this 
salutary rule." Sinking Fund Cases, 9 Otto 700, 718 (1878). 
Even where the authority of one branch over a matter is not 
exclusive, so that a federal court properly may accept jurisdic-
tion over the dispute, we have recognized that the principle of 
separation of powers continues to have force as a matter of 
policy. For example, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
683 (1974), we held on the one hand that the question whether 
the President had a claim of privilege as to conversations with 
his advisers was an issue to be resolved by the judiciary, and 
on the other hand that separation-of-powers considerations re-
quired the recognition of a qualified privilege. 
Whether or not the employment decisions of a Member of 
Congress fall within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause 
of the Constitution, a question the Court does not reach today,3 
it is clear that these decisions are bound up with the conduct of 
his duties. As THE CHIEF JusTICE observes, ante, a Con-
gressman necessarily relies heavily on his personal staff in dis-
charging the duties of his office. Because of the nature of his 
office, he must rely to an extraordinary extent on the loyalty 
and compatibility of everyone who works for him. Cf. Elrod 
v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 377-388 ( 1976) (PowELL, J., dissent-
ing). A Congressman simply cannot perform his constitu-
.,... 
ptecedent, but also constitutes a nofuequitur. Our com;titutional struc-
ture of government. rests on a variety of checks and balances; the u· ~mef! 
of one such check doPs not negate all others. 
3 It is quitP doubtful whether the Court should not consider respondent's 
Speech or Debate Clau~e claim as a threshold i~Rue. The purpose of that 
Clause, when it applies, includeti the protection of Members of Congress 
from the harassment. of litigation. Since the Court chooses not to consider 
this claim, and addresses only the cause of action issue, I limit my dissent 
accordingly. In doing so, I imply no view a;; to the merits of the speech 
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tiona.l duties effectively, or serve his constituents properly, 
unless he is supported by a staff in which he has total 
confidence. 
The foregoing would seem self-evident even if Congress had 
not indicated an intention to reserve to its Members the right 
to select, employ and discharge staff personnel without judicial 
interference. But Congress unmistakably has made clear its 
view on this subject. It took pains to exempt itself from the 
coverage of Title VII. Unless the Court is abandoning or 
modifying sub silentio our holding in Brown v. General Serv-
ices Administration, 425 U. S. 820 (1976), that Title VII as 
amended "provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims 
of discrimination in federal employment," id., at 835, the 
exemption from this statute for congressional employees should 
bar all judicial relief. 
In sum, the decision of the Court today is not an exercise 
of principled discretion. It avoids our obligation to take into 
account the range of policy and constitutional considerations 
that we would expect a legislature to ponder in determining 
whether a particular remedy should be enacted. It fails to 
weigh the legitimate interests of Members of Congress. In-
-deed, the decision simply ignores the constitutional doctrine 
of separation of powers. In my view, the serious intrusion 
upon the authority of Members of Congress to choose and con-
trol their own personal staffs cannot be justified.• 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
• Th(' justification the Court r('lies upon 1s the duty of federal courts 
to vindicate constitutional rights-a duty no one disputes. But it never 
has been thought that this duty required a blind exercise of judicial power 
without regard to other interests or constitutional principles. Indeed, it 
would not be surprising for Congress to consider today's action unwarranted 
and to exercise its authority to reassert the proper balance between the 
legislative and judicial branches. If the reaction took the form of limiting 
the jurisdiction of federal courts, the effect conceivably could be to frus-
trate the vindication of rights properly protected by the Court. 
~ --:.. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL. with whom MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST 
joins, dissenting. 
Although I join the opinion of THE CHIEF JusTICE, I write 
separately to emphasize that no prior decision of this Court 
justifies today's intrusion upon the legitimate powers of 
Members of Congress. 
The Court's analysis starts with the general proposition that 
"the judiciary is clearly discernible as the primary means 
through which [constitutional] rights may be enforced," ante, 
at 13. It leaps from this generalization, unexceptionable it-
self, to the conclusion that individuals who have suffered an 
injury to a constitutionally protected interest, and who lack an 
11effective" alternative, "must be able to invoke the existing 
jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable 
constitutional rights. )' ld., at 14 (emphasis supplied). Apart 
from the dubious logic of this reasoning, I know of no prece-
dent of this Court that supports such an absolute statement 
of the federal judiciary's obligation to entertain private suits 
that Congress has not authorized. On the contrary, I have 
thought it clear that federal courts must exercise a principled 
discretion when called upon to infer a private cause of action 
directly from the language of the Constitution. In the 
present case, for reasons well summarized by THE CHIEF Jus-
TICE, principles of comity and separation of powers should 
require a federal court to stay its hand. 
To be sure, it has been clear-at least since Bivens v. Si:t 
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971)-that 
--
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in appropriate circumstances private causes of action may be 
inferred from provisions of the Constitution.1 But the exer .. 
cise of this responsibility involves discretion, and a weighing 
of relevant concerns. As Mr. Justice Harlan observed in ad-
dressing this very point, a court should "take into account [a 
range of policy considerations] at least as broad as the range 
of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express 
statutory authorization of a traditional remedy." Bivens, 
supra, at 407. 
Among those policies that a court certainly should considet 
in deciding whether to imply a constitutional right of action is 
that of comity toward an equal and coordinate branch oi 
government.2 As Chief Justice Waite observed over a century 
1 A court necessarily has wider latitude in interpreting the Constitution 
than it does in construing a statute, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 
316, 407 (1819). Moreover, the federal courts have a far greater responsi-
bility under the Constitution for the protection of those rights derived 
directly from it, than for the definition and enforcement of rights created 
solely by Congress. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 40S 
U.S. 388,407 (1971) (Harlan, J ., concurring). 
2 It is settled that where di~cretion exists, a variety of factors rooted in 
the Constitution may lead a federal court to refuse to entertain an other-
wise properly presented co~titutional claim. See, e. g., Moore v. Sims,-
U. S. - (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. 
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); H·uffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (i971); Alabama Public Service Commis-
sion v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 
319 U. S. 157 (1943); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943); Rail" 
road Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Hawks v. Hamill, 
288 U. S. 52 (1933). Traditionally the issue has arisen in the context of 
a federal court's exercise of its equity powers with respect to the States. 
Concerns of comity similar to those that govern our dealings with the 
States should come into play when we are asked to interfere with the 
functioning of Congress. 
The Court suggests that because the Speech or Debate Clause of the 
Constitution embodies a :;pparatwn-of-powen; principle, the Corstitution 
afford:; no furthpr protection to thP prerogatives of Members of Congress. 
Ante, at 17. This assertion not only marks a striking departure fran~ 
--
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ago, "One branch of government cannot encroach on the 
domain of another without danger. The safety of our institu-
tions depends in no small degree 'on a strict observance of this 
salutary rule." Sinking Fund Cases, 9 Otto 700, 718 (1878). 
Even where the authority of one branch over a matter is not 
exclusive, so that a federal court properly may accept jurisdic-
tion over the dispute, we have recognized that the principle of 
separation of powers continues to have force as a matter of 
policy. For example, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
683 (1974), we held on the one hand that the question whether 
the President had a claim of privilege as to conversations with 
his advisers was an issue to be resolved by the judiciary, and 
on the other hand that separation-of-powers considerations re-
quired the recognition of a qualified privilege. 
Whether or not the employment decisions of a Member of 
Congress fall within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause 
of the Constitution, a question the Court does not reach today,3 
it is clear that these decisions are bound up with the conduct of 
his duties. As THE CHIEF JusTICE observes, ante, a Con-
gressman necessarily relies heavily on his personal staff in dis-
charging the duties of his office. Because of the nature of his 
office, he must rely to an extraordinary extent on the loyalty 
and compatibility of everyone who works for him. Cf. Elrod 
v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 377-388 (1976) (PowELL, J., dissent-
ing). A Congressman simply cannot perform his constitu-
..... ~ 
ptecedent, but also constitutes a nonseqmtur . Our constitutional 
lure of government rests on a variety of checks and balances; the if. ~'M'I'' 
of one such check does not negate all others. 
3 It is quite doubtful whether the Court should not consider respondent's 
Speech or Debate Chm~e claim as a threshold i~sue. The purpose of that 
Clause, when it applies, includes the protection of Members of Congress 
from the harassment of litigation. Since the Court chooses not to consider 
this claim, and addm;ses only the cause of action issue, I limit my dissent 
accordingly. In doing so, I imply no view as to the merits of the speech 
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tiona! duties effectively, or serve his constituents properly, 
unless he is supported by a staff in which he has total 
confidence. 
The foregoing would seem self-evident even if Congress had 
not indicated an intention to reserve to its Members the right 
to select, employ and discharge staff personnel without judicial 
interference. But Congress unmistakably has made clear its 
view on this subject. It took pains to exempt itself from the . S) j 0 N 
coverage of Title VII. Unless the Court is abandoning or 1 0 ~1 
modifying sub silentio our holding in Brown v. General Serv-
ices Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976), that Title VII as 
amended "provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims 
of discrimination in federal employment," id., at 835, the 
exemption from this statute for congressional employees should 
bar all judicial relief. 
In sum, the decision of the Court today is not an exercise 
of principled discretion. It avoids our obligation to take into 
account the range of policy and constitutional considerations 
that we would expect a legislature to ponder in determining 
whether a particular remedy should be enacted. It fails to 
weigh the legitimate interests of Members of Congress. In-
'Cl.eed, the decision simply ignores the constitutional doctrine 
of separation of powers. In my view, the serious intrusion 
upon the authority of Members of Congress to choose and con-
trol their own personal staffs cannot be justified.4 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
4 The justification the Court relies upon is the duty of federal courts 
to vindicate constitutiOnal rights-a duty no one disputes. But it never 
has been thought that this duty required a blind exercise of judicial power 
without regard to other intert>sts or constitutional principles. Indeed, it 
would not be surpnsing for Congress to cons1der today's action unwarranted 
and to exercise its authority to reassert the proper balance between the 
legislative and judicial branches. If tlw reaction took the form of limiting 
the jurisdiction of federal courts, the effect conceivably could be to frus-
trate the vindication of rights properly protected by the Court. 
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/ 
I exercise the privilege we have - though rarely 
Q 
usee' - to dissent orally. This is a uniquely important case 
to the proper functioning of our system of government. The 
question, in essence, is whether one branch of government may 
deprive the constitutional officers of another branch of the 
power to choose their own .meet ee-ni~staff members. 
The petitioner was employed by respondent Passman, 
then a member of Congress, as his Deputy Administrative 
Assistant. 'Z 
• 
Passman lperhaps with improvident candor .J stated 
that because of the "unusually heavy workload" and the 
"diversity" of the position, he preferred to have a man 
rather than a woman as his Administrative Assistant. 
Petitioner sued the Congressman for damages, claiming a 
violation of the Equal Protection component of the Due 
Process Clause. No statute authorizes a suit of this kind. 
Indeed, Congress refrained from including itself under Title 
VII . The question is whether a right to sue may be inferred 
from the Constitution itself. The Court today answers this 
in the affirmative. 
2. 
//_____ The Court did reserve judgment as to whether the ... _Y 







suit against a Congressman. By its terms, the Clause applies 
only to "a speech or debate in either house". But however 
the question as to its applicability may be decided, the 
~-~u_d_:ment today will remain in effect. 
Th.t. Hi-s rationale'fcannot be limited to the legislative 
cA -t~· s d...t. c 1.!. ;c.N'\ 
branch. It appears to extend equally to the executive and 
judicial branches. If staff members of a Congressman are 
free to sue for damages upon termination of services, members 
of the personal staff of a President or a federal judge would 
seem to have a like cause of action. 
The Court's decision, in my view, contravenes basic 
principles that underlie the separation of powers doctrine. 
More than 100 years ago Chief Justice Waite observed that 
"one branch of government cannot encroach on the domain of 
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- • Whether it be the President, a member of Congress 
or a r she will 
/ l ~forme~g/"constituti 
~ suppo~d by a personal - satisfactory staff 
\~wb~ ther~ is total confidence. 
or she i 
in each member of 
I have no reason to believe that discrimination, in 
hiring or firing, is practiced by members of Congress. 
Questions of discrimination involve subtle issues of fact and 
intent. They ~ must be resolved by a lawsuit. If 
senior officials of government live under the threat of 
damage suits by disappointed job applicants, or by employees 
discharged or not promoted, such officials no longer will be 
free to control their own personal staffs. 
There is no precedent in our prior decisions for 
this serious intrusion by courts upon the functioning at the 
highest levels of the separate branches of government. 
lfpjss 6/4/79 78-5072 Davis v. Passman 
Dissent from the Bench 
I exercise the privilege we have - though rarely 
used - to dissent orally. This is a uniquely important case 
to the proper functioning of our system of government. The 
question, in essence~ is whether one branch of government may 
deprive the constitutional officers of another branch of the 
power to choose their own most senior staff members. 
The petitioner was employed by respondent Passman, 
then a member of Congress, as his Deputy Administrative 
Assistant. 
Passman, perhaps with improvident candor, stated 
that because of the "unusually heavy workload" and the 
"diversity" of the position, he preferred to have a man 
rather than a woman as his Administrative Assistant. 
Petitioner sued the Congressman for damages, claiming a 
violation of the Equal Protection component of the Due 
Process Clause. No statute authorizes a suit of this kind. 
Indeed, Congress refrained from including itself under Title 
VII. The question is whether a right to sue may be inferred 
from the Constitution itself. The Court today answers this 
in the affirmative. 
2. 
The Court did reserve judgment as to whether the 
Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution forbids such a 
suit against a Congressman. By its terms, the Clause applies 
only to "a speech or debate in either house". But however 
the question as to its applicability may be decided, the 
judgment today will remain in effect. 
Its rationale cannot be limited to the legislative 
branch. It appears to extend equally to the executive and 
judicial branches. If staff members of a Congressman are 
free to sue for damages upon termination of services, members 
of the personal staff of a President or a federal judge would 
seem to have a like cause of action. 
The Court's decision, in my view, contravenes basic 
principles that underlie the separation of powers doctrine. 
More than 100 years ago Chief Justice Waite observed that 
"one branch of government cannot encroach on the domain of 
another without danger ••• to our institutions." 
3. 
Whether it be the President, a member of Congress 
or a federal judge, he or she will be handicapped in 
performning constitutional duties unless he or she is 
supported by a personall satisfactory staff in each member of 
which there is total confidence. 
I have no reason to believe that discrimination, in 
hiring or firing, is practiced by members of Congress. 
Questions of discrimination involve subtle issues of fact and 
intent. They usually must be resolved by a lawsuit. If 
senior officials of government live under the threat of 
damage suits by disappointed job applicants, or by employees 
discharged or not promoted, such officials no longer will be 
free to control their own personal staffs. 
There is no precedent in our prior decisions for 
this serious intrusion by courts upon the functioning at the 
highest levels of the separate branches of government. 
lfp/ss 6/4/79 
~C.-/( 4~··- ~ 
78~5072 Davis v. Pqssman 
Dissent from the Bench 
to dissent orally 
privilege we have - though rarely use -
This is a uniquely important cas~o the 
proper functioning;lcf our system of government. The question, in 
essence, is whether one branch of government~may deprive the 
constitutional officers of another branch~of the power to choose 
their ~mbers. 
~ 
The petitioner was employed by respondent Passman, then 
a member of Congress, as his Deputy Administrative Assistant. 
~~P~~~~~ #<~~~ 
PassmanA s  because of the "unusually heavy 
workload"/ and the "diversity" of the position ,; he preferred to 
have a man rather than a woman as his Administrative Assistant. 
)q Petitioner sued the Congressman for damages, claiming a violation 
of the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause. /.t No 
statute authorizes a suit of this kind. Indeed, Congress 
refrained from including itself under Title VII. The question/ is 
whether a right to su~may be inferred from the Constitution 
itself. The Court today answers this in the affirmative. 
The rationale of this decision~annot be limit~d to the 
legislative branch. It appears to extend equally to the executive 
and judicial branches. If staff members of ~ Congressman/are free 
to bring suits of this kind/ for damages, / members of the personal 
staff of a P~ent)~r a federal judgy would seem to have a like 
cause of action. 
The Court's decision, in my view, contravenes basic 
principles;ihat underlie the separation of powers doctrine. More 
than 100 years ago / chief Justice Waite observeo/that "one branch 
of government cannot encroach/ on the domain of anothe;lwithout 
danger • .• to our institutions." ~~·lA.-~~ 
~ .. I have no reason to believe that discrimination, in 
hiring, promoting or firing, is practiced by members of Congress. 
~~uestions of discrimination;'involve subtle issues of fact/ and 
intent. They often must be resolved by a lawsuit. --
If senior officials of government / live under the threat 
of damage suits ~by disappointed job ae plicants,j or by ~~es 
~ 
discharge~or ~t promoted,~such officials no longer will be free 
to contro~their ~n p~son~l s~. 
There is no precedent in our prior cases for this 
serious intrusion by courts;Gpon the functioningjfat the highest 
levels/ of the separate branches of government. Accordingly, I 
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MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: Davis v. Passman, No. 78-5072 
DATE: April 30, 1979 
Mr. Justice Powell, dissenting. 
The Court today leaps from the general proposition that 
"the judiciary is clearly discernible as the primary means 
through which [constitutional] rights may be enforced," ante at 
13, to the specific declaration that individuals who have 
suffered an injury to a constitutionally protected interes?~ 
"must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts 
for the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights." 
Id. at 14 (emphasis supplied). I cannot accept such an absolute 
'Fowl-. I 
statement of the federal judiciary's obligation to entertain .f'....t -\'ki., 
private suits 
1:...~ ¥~1 ('~+ 




that Congress has not e~pressly authori f ed. In 14 ~,.,\ 
i 1 ...... r.~-~<-•r~t-'> (.)f' .........do, -tl ~ · . 11~r ~,... 
u - C' I ~Hill 
believe that oouAt8t a-iHn9 f-actors )3£eaen<o R=a- :lk•~ 
~ ~  
require a federal court to stay its hand. w~Y.C'J 
~so·"'S 
I have stated elsewhere my objections in principle to 
the creation of 
I <;\~\vtO'(y J 
privatel causes of action by federal courts, a 
process that permits the judiciary to arrogate to itself the 
2. 
power to resolve designated disputes in contravention of the 
constitutional obligation of Congress to make such decisions. 
I 
See Cannon v. University of · Chicago, u.s. (1979) 
(Powell, J., dissenting). I concede that the implication of 
private actions from the provisions of the Constitution presents 
a different problem. 
I ~ 
T e process of Id. , at n. 3. 
constitutional interpretation necessarily involves greater 
latitude on the part of a court than the construction of a 
/ 
statute.( McCulloch v. Marylc;md, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819). 
Moreover, the federal courts have a far greater responsibility 
under the Constitution for the protection of those rights 
derived directly from it, than for the definition and 
enforcement of rights created solely by Congress. Bivens v. Six 
I 
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 u.s. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, 
J., concurring). In exercising this latitude and meeting this 
responsibility, we may be required in certain circumstances to 
permit resort to the federal courts for private enforcement of 
these rights. It should not be forgotten, however, that the 
implication of private action for constitutional violations 
constitutes an exercise of principled discretion, and "that the 
range of policy considera ions we may take into account is at 
least as broad as the range of those a legislature would 
consider with respect to an express statutory authorization of a 
I 
traditional remedy." Id. 
3. 
Among those policies which a court ~~should 
consider in deciding whether to imply a constitutional right of 
action is that of comity toward an equal and coordinate branch 
of government. As Chief Justice Waite~ observed over a 
century ago, '# e branch of government cannot encroach on the 
domain of another without danger. The safety of our 
institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance 
I 
of this salutary rule." Sinking Fund Cases, 9 Otto 700, 718 
(1878). Even where the authority of one branch over a matter is 
not exclusive, so that a federal court properly may accept 
jurisdiction over the dispute, we have recognized that the 
principle of separation of powers continues to have force as a 
v 
matter of policy. For example, in United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683 (1974), we held on the one hand that the question 
whether the President had a claim of privilege as to 
conversations with his advisers was an issue to be resolved by 
the judiciary, and on the other hand that separation-of-powers 
considerations required . the recognition of a qualified 
privilege. A similar approach should govern here. 
Whe ther or not the employment decisions of a member of 
Congress fall within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause of 
the Constitution, it is clear that these matters are bound up 
A .; c' ~ ) d I) 
with the conduct of his duties~p{ congressffian necessarily 
r~\ : J., ~~~ a. 
r~;l" \)4- l fl-..4-
rli~ ~brot-4 
~~~~~ 
(• 1$.-ovM t --
4. 
relies on his personal staff in carrying out his work. Because 
of the nature of his office, he must rely to an extraordinary 
extent on the loyalty and compatibility of everyone who works 
j 
for him. Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 377-388 (1976) 
(Powell, J., dissenting). Any degree of judicial interference 
with the process through which these positions are filled will 
be disruptive as well as engender resentment and hostility on 
the part of Conqress. 
Furthermore, the best evidence we have indicates that 
Congress does not wish to permit judic~l review of its hiring 
decisions. Unlike the Court, I cannot brush aside the clear 
inference to be drawn from the decision of Congress to exempt 
2.. 
itself from the coverage of Title VII. Unless the Court is 
fN ~~~ .. \y c~U,'o 
abandoning Lour holding in Brown v. General Services 
j l TO)_, 
Administration, 425 U.S. 820, that Title VII as amended 
( "provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of 
[ discrimination in federal employment," id. , at 8 3 5, the 
exemption from this statute for congressional employees should 
bar all judicial relief. 
In sum, the decision of the Court today frustrates 
principles of inter-branch cooperation that should guide the 
exercise of our discretion to imply constitutional causes of 
actions. In so doing, the Court ignores a clear/ and in -my v~ 
5. 
~indin~expression of legislative 
~ l<> yuW:,\' J 
inten suits of this 
kind. This course inevitably will lead to conflict between 
Congress and the judiciary, which in turn can only undermine the 
position of the federal courts as the primary means of 
vindicating constitutional interests in the face of popular 
attack. I cannot condone this use of the federal courts, and 
therefore dissent. 
PBS-5/2/79 
1. It no longer is controversial that where discretion 
exists, a variety of factors rooted in the Constitution may lead 
a federal court to refuse to entertain an otherwise properly 
~ presented constitutional claim. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, --
J 
u.s. (1979): Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977): 
J 
Juidice v. Vail, 430 u.s. 327 (1977): Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 
I 
420 U.S. 592 {1975): Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S 37 (1971): 
..; 
Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S. 
J 
341 (1951): Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943): 
j 
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943): Railroad 
I 
Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941): Hawks v. 
j 
Hamill, 288 u.s. 52 (1933). t Althoug~ ~raditionally the issue 
has arisen in the context of a federal court's exercise of its 
~'"'-~ rec.r c\ 1u s\~t( rowtc\tll~· J 
equity powersf~~hese ~rs are pr:esent here to an equal i 
?OWJL C.Ol'\{b"r\!> O~ C,t.J\'\o\\ty ~~t ~~'V\ eN( ~4-I1W13 WI~ 
degree s r~\v.> ~te.s~u,\y C.\tV'M- '"'\-D p\~y IIJ~ ~ ~ c.t\~ vr""" 
\ ~lruk W\~ -tw.... ww\c.'"'S oF cj~~. 
2. Nor do I understand the Court's statement that an 
express congressional prohibition of judicial review of these 
decisions "would not necessarily be binding on this Court." 
Ante, at 18. 
1
1---we-lakl na-v-e- thouqht that- -the power-o f- C-ongress to~ 
.. 
\k C~t ~-r·:e\e .. t\~ ~ c.c."'f~ ~ puwu- o~ (~~H 
[ 
~ f\~ ~·-- \,~t.~ ~ ~ j"""\c.dt<-'h\1\-\ 0~ ~_) 
Co-W~O FN2. 
rJ-r it the ;tldsdtetion of-fe<l~euclo-s-wa.s established be¥Ond j 
doubt, Certainly-me~ -deeis±ous ha11e aecepted t-his { 
I 
.p.FO-po-si Lion as rue See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 
/ 
182 (1943)~ Lauf v. E~G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938)~ 
I I 
Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (186 9 )~ Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 
440 (1850). For a persuasive defense of the exclusive power of 
Congress to define the limits of federal jurisdictio~~ perha~ 
~oremost~ntemporary scholar in ~e are~ see Wechsler, The 
Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1004-1008 
~ 
(1965). Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 
673, 682 (1930), cited by the Court as support for the authority 
of a federal court to reject legislative limitations on its 
jurisdiction, is completely inapposite: The issue there 
involved the power of a state legislature to limit the means of 
vindicating federal rights. This is quite different from 
deciding which co-equal branch of the federal government has the 
authority to determine how these rights may be enforced. 
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1. It no lGn~s~ is ~rove~si~ that where discretion 
" 
exists, a variety of factors rooted in the Constitution may lead 
a federal court to refuse to entertain an· otherwise properly 
presented constitutional claim. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 
u.s. (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); 
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 
420 U.S. 592 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S 37 (1971); 
Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S. 
341 (1951); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); 
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Railroad 
Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Hawks v. 
Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933). Traditionally the issue has arisen 
in the context of a federal court's exercise of its equity 
fu Stcitsu . 
powers with respect to ~aee prace~Jn~. The same concerns of 
~
comity that govern our dealings with the States ~esa~y 
~~ 
com~ into play when we are asked to interfere with the ~werkin~s 
of Congress. 
2. Nor do I understand the Court's statement that an 
express congressional prohibition of judicial review of these 
FN2. 
decisions "would not necessarily be binding on this Court." 
.)aA-.1~~~) 
Ante, at 18. The Court repeatedly has ac~pted the power of 
" 
Congress to place limitations on the jurisdiction of federal 
courts. See,~, Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 u.s. 182 (1943); 
Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 u.s. 323 (1938); _Ex parte -r- ...__ 
McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 440 _..._ 
(1850). For a ~~~aai~e defense of the exclusive power of 
Congress to define the limits of federal jurisdiction, see 
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 
1001, 1004-1008 (1965). Brinker~off-Faris I~ust & §!vings Co. 
v. H!ll, 281 U.S. 673, 682 (1930), cited by the Court as support 
for the authority of a federal court to reject legislative 
limitations on its jurisdiction, is completely inapposite: The 
issue there involved the power of a state legislature to limit 
the means of vindicating federal rights. This is quite 
different from deciding which co-equal branch of the federal 
government has the authority to determine how these rights may 
be enforced. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ -~~ 
~W--- No.78-5072 ~~~u-~ 
 ..-.c.e16c~~<. 
S Vv fr ~avis, Petitioner, l On Writ of Certiorari to the tr( A-<-~ 
~ 2J v. United States Court of Appeals ~ /--'""~ 
- rD Otto E. Passman. for the Fifth Circuit. a.. d...j.. _ ~ . 
[April -, 1979] -~s~~. 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. - J ~/C 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bu- I 
reau of Narcotics, 403 tJ. S. 388 (1971), held that a "cause of 
action for damages" arises under the Constitution when 
Fourth Amendment rights are violated. The issue presented 
for decision in this case is whether a cause of action and a 
damages remedy can also be implied directly under the Con-
stitution when the Du~ Cla~e of the Fifth Amend-
ment is violated. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
en bane, concluded that "no civil action for damages" can be 
thus implied. 571 F. 2d 793, 801 (1978). We granted cer-
_tiorari,- U.S.- (1978), and we now reverse. 
I 
At the time this case commenced. respondent Otto E. 
·Passman was a United States Cougressman from the Fifth 
Congressional District of Louisiana.1 On February 1. 1974, 
Passman hired petitioner Shirley Davis as a deputy adminis-
trative assistant. ~ Passman subsequently terminated her 
1 Passman was drft'ated in the 1976 primary election, and hi;; tenure in 
cffice ended January :3 , Hl77. 
2 In her complaint. Davi~ :1ver~ that her ":salary was Sl8,000.00 per yea.r 
with thr rxpecta t ion of n promotion to defendn nt'~ uclminist rn t i\·e a::;::;istnnt 
at a salary of 832,000.00 prr year upon . the imminrnt retirement o( 
dcfend:mt':s current ndmini;;trative a,.:si:shmt." App. , n1 4. 
Davis was not hirrcl through the competitive service. Srr. 2 U. S. C. 
§ 92. 
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employment, effective July 31, 1974, writing Davis that, 
although she was an "able. energetic and a very hard worker," 
he had concluded "that it was essential that the understudy to 
my Administrative Assistant be a man." 3 App., at 6. 
Davis brought suit in the United States District Court .for 
the Western District of Louisiana, alleging that Passman's 
8 The full test of Passman's letter is as follows: 
"Dear Mrs. Davis: 
"My Washington staff joins me in saying that we miss you very much. 
But, in ali probability, inwardly they all agree that I was doing you an 
injustice by asking you to assume a responsibility that was so trying and 
so hard that it would have taken all of the pleasure out of your work, 
I must be completely fair with you, so please note the following: 
· "You are able, energetic and a very hard worker. Certainly you com-
mand the respect of those. with whom you work; however, on account of 
the unusually heavy work load in my Washington Office, and the diversity 
of the job, I concluded that it was essential that the understudy to my 
Administrative Assistant be a man. · I believe you ·will agree with this 
conclusion. 
"It would be unfair to yoti for me to · ask you to waste your talent 
and experience in my. Monroe office because of the low salary that is 
available because of a junior position. · Therefore, and so that your 
experience and talent may be used to' advantage in some organization in 
need of an extremely capable ~ecretary, I desire that you be continued 
on the payroll at your present salary through July 31, 1974. This arrange-
ment gives you your full year's vacation of one month, plus one additional 
month. May. I further say that the work load in the Monroe office is 
very limited, and since you would come in as a junior member of the 
staff at such a low salary, it would actual!)· be an offen~e to you. 
"I know that secretaries -with your ability are very much in ·demand in 
Monroe. If an additional letter of recommendation from me would be 
advantageous to you, do not hesitate to let me know. Again, assuring you 
that my Washington staff and your humble Congressllliln feel that the 
contribution you made to our Washington office has· helped all of us. 
"With best wishes, 
App., at 6-=-7, 
Sincerely, 
js/ Otto E. Passman 
OTTO E. ·PASSl\IAN 
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conduct discriminated against her "on the basis of sex in 
violation of the United States Constitution and the Fifth 
Amendment thereto." /d., at 4. Davis sought damages in 
the form of backpay. /d., at 5! Jurisdiction for her suit was 
founded on 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a), which provides in per-
tinent part that federal "district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in contto-
versy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 ... and arises ___........,. 
under the Constitution ... of the United States .... " 
Passman moved to dismiss Davis' action for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 
12 (b)( 6), arguing, inter alia, that "the law affords no private 
right of action" for her claim.5 App. , at 8. The District 
Court accepted this argument, ruling that Davis had "no 
private right of action." /d. , at 9.6 A p.anel of the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 544 F. 2d 865 (1977). 
The panel concluded that a cause of action for damages arose 
directly under the Fifth Amendment; that, taking as true the 
allegations in Davis' complaint, Passman's conduct violated 
the Fifth Amendment; and that Passman's conduct was not 
shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, 
Art. I, § 6, cl. 1.7 
'Davis also sought equitable relief in the form of reinstatement , as well 
as a promotion and sahll'~ · increase. App., at 4-5. Since Passman is no 
longer a Congrr:;:oman, however, see n . 1, supra, these forms of relief are 
no longer available. 
6 Passman also argued that his alleged conduct was "not violative of the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution," and that relief was barred "by 
reason of the sovereign immunity doctrine and the official immunity doc-
trine." App., at 8. 
8 The District Court al:;o ruled that, although "the doctrines of sovereign 
and official immunity" did not justify di:omissal of Davis' complaint, "the 
discharge of plaintiff on alleged grounds of sex discrimination by defendant 
is not violative of the Fifth Amendment to the Con:; titution ." App., at 9. 
7 The panel abo held that, although sovereign immunity did not bar a 
damages award aguin:l t Pas:;man individually, he was entitled at trial to 
a defense of qualified immunity. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed the decision of the panel. The en bane Court did not 
reach the merits, nor diJ it discuss the application of the Speech 
or Debate Clause. The Court instead held that "no right of 
action may be implied from the Due Process Clause of the 
fifth amendment." 571 F. 2d, a.t 801. The Court reached 
this conclusion on the basis of the criteria that had been set 
out in ./Cart v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), for determining 
whether a private cause of action should be implied from a 
federal statute.8 Noting that Congress had failed to create ~;t 
1 The criteria set out in Cort v. Ash nrc: 
"First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the 
statute was enacted,' Texas & Pacific R . Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 39 
(1916) (cmphatiis supplied)-that i;;, does the statute create a federal 
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indicntion of legisla-
tive intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny 
one? See, e. g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of 
Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458, 460 (19-i4) (Amt rak ). Third, 
is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to 
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? See, e. g., Amtrak, supra; Securi-
ties Investor Ptotection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 423 (1975); 
Calhoon v. Harbey, 3i9 U. S. 134 (1964). And finally, is the cause of 
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area · basically the 
concern of the ~tates, so that it would ·be inappropriate to infer a cause 
of action batied solely on federal law? See Wheeldin v. TV heeler, 373 U. S. 
647, 652 (1963); cf. J. I . Case Co. v. Borak. 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964); 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 394-395 
· (1971); id., at .400 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment)." 422 U. S., 
at 78. 
The Court of' Appeals had some difficulty applying these criteria to 
· determine whether a cause of action should be implied under the Constitu-
tion. It eventually concluded, however, (1) that although "the fifth 
· amendment right to due procesti certainly confers a right upon Davis, the 
injury nlleged here does not infringe this right as directly as" the violation 
of the Fourth Amendment rights alleged in Bivens, 571 F. 2d, at 797; 
· (2) that "[ c]ongressional remedial legislation · for employment discrimi-
t-1~~ nation h:ts care~ully a~·~idcd ~rratin~ a. cause of action_ for ~on~y damages 
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damages remedy for those in Davis' position, the Court also 
concluded that "the proposed damage remedy is not constitu· 
tionally compelled" so that it was not necessary to "counter· 
mand the clearly discernible will of Congress" and create such 
a remedy. 571 F. 2d, at 800. 
II 
In Bivems v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, supra, federal agents had allegedly 
arrested and searched Bivens without probable cause, thereby 
subjecting him to great humiliation, embarrassment, and 
mental suffering. Bivens held that the Fourth Amendment 
guarantee against "unreasonable searches and s~izures" was a 
constitutional right which Bivens could enforce through a 
private cause of action, and that a dam~s remedy was an 
appropriate form of redress. ~ast Term, Butz· v. Economou, 
438 U. S. 478 (1978), reaffirmed this holding, stating that 
"the decision in Bivens established that a citizen suffer· 
ing a compensable injury to a constitutionally protected 
interest could invoke the general federal-question jurisdiction 
of the district courts to obtain an award of monetary damages 
against the responsible federal official." I d., at 504. 
Today we hold that Bivens and Butz require reversal of the· -holding of the en bane Court of Appeals. Our inquiry pro-
ceeds in three stages. We hold ~illthat, preterm1ttmg the· 
q~estion""'Whethe;-;espondent's conduct is shielded by the 
Speech or Debate Clause, the right asserted by petitioner 
is justiciable;~ that petitioner has stated a cause of 
action which asserts this right; and lffifiill that relief in 
dam11ges constitutes an appropriate form of remedy. 
Fourth Amendmrnt, "the brea.dth of the concept of due process indicates 
that the damagr remedy sought will not be judicially manngrable," id., 
at 799; and ( 4) that implying a cause of action under the Due Process 
Clause would create "the danger of deluging Jedernl courts with claims 
otherwise rcdressable in ~tate courts or administrative proceedings .... " .. 
/d., at SOO; 
I 
/J:!:j . 
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A 
The Fifth Amendment provides that "{n]o person shall 
be ... deprived of life, liberty1 or prop~rty, ~ithou·t d~e 
process of law .... " In numl:lrol.ls decisions, this Court 
"has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment forbids the Federal Government from denying equal 
protection of the laws; E. g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 
426 U. S. 88, 100 ( 1976); Buckl'ey v. Valeo, 424 U. S. ·l, _93 
(1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. 8; 636, 638 :n. 2 
(1975); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (H!54)." Va~ce 
v. Bradley, - U. S. -, - n.' 1• (1979). "To withstand 
scrutiny under the equal protection component . o.f th'e Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause, 'classifications by gender 
must serve important governmental objectives 'and niust . be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.' 
'craig v. Boren, 429 U. ~.~, 1 .~0, )97 (1976)." · Califano v, 
Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316- 317 (1977).9 · . · . 
The Equal Protection Componei1t of the Due Proqess Cla.use 
thus confers on petitioner a feder~l constitutional right to be 
free from gender discrimination which cannot meet these 
' I ""'·· 
requirements.10 Respond~nt argues, however, that in this case 
~uch a right is nonjusticiable because judicial determination of 
the "important governmental obj~ctives" served by gender-. 
I 1 .·, o • o• \ 
9 Before . it can be determined whether .petitioner's Fifth Amendment 
right has been viol!\t~d, the,refor~, jnquiry J~ust be undertaken into what 
"important goyernn~,enta~ .objec t.~":~s, " if any, a~e ~erved by the gender-
based en1ploytr\ent . q( congre;sional staff.. Sec 'n, 20, infra. We express 
no views as to,. the ol1tcome of..this inquiry. JVe note only that if such 
gender-based en1ployment docs not serve '·'important governmental objec-
tives'' or, is n.qt "substantially related to the achiev.en1ent" of such objec-
tives, th~ .r.equirements of the F!fth Amendment will have been violated. 
" 10 This tight is personal; it i ~ petitioner, after all, who mu:st suffer the 
effects of such discrimination. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, - , 
U.
1 
S . . -, - n. 1:3 (1979) ; ef. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United 
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based employment of congressional staff will necessarily involve 
a "lack of respect due coordinate branches of government." 
Balcer v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 (1962). Respondent fears 
that if petitioner's right is enforced, "the judiciary soon will 
be dictating to Congressmen and Congresswomen how their 
legislative responsibilities should be performed in the sense 
that it will dictate by whom they should be performed." 
Brief for Respondent 22. 
We disagree. The S~use of the Con-
stitution, Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, functwns "to protect the integ-
rity of the legislative process by insuring the independence 
of individual legislators." United States v. Brewster, 408 
U. S. 501, 507 (1972). It is a paradigm example of "a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] 
issue to a coordinate political department." Balcer v. Carr, 
supra, at 217. A Congressman must of course be free to 
hire th staff necessary or 1111 to function "within Jhe 
'sphere of e 1ma e egis at1ve activity.' " Eastland~ v. 
Umte tates Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491, 501 (1975). 
See Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 616-617 (1972). 
If petitioner's employment was in fact of this nature, respond-
ent will be shielded with absolute immunity by the Clause, 
"not only from the consequences of litigation's results, but 
also from the burden of defending [himself]." Dombrowski 
v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967). But if respondent's con-
duct is not protected by the Clause, it will be because peti~n­
er's position was so unrelated to "the le islative rocess" t at 
the ins Itutional interests of the Congress as a coordinate 
aepartment will not be impaired by judicial review of respond-
ent's liability for the termination of her employment. 
The en bane Court of Appeals did not decide whether 
respondent was shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause. We 
also intimate no view 1 hat issue. We conclude only that 
if the Clause s 1ould not apply, the question whether respond-
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rights would, as we stated in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 
486 (1969), 
"require no more than an interpretation of the Constitu~ 
tion. Such a determination falls within the traditional 
role accorded courts to interpret the ·law, and does not 
involve a 'lack of respect due [a] coordinate branch of 
government,' nor does it involve an 'initial policy deter~ 
ruination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.1 
. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, at 217." 395 U. S., at 
548-549. 
We hold, therefore, that if respondent's dismissal of petitioner 
w-;;;ot within the sph~re of legitimate legislative activity 
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, petitioner's claim 
sets forth a justiciable right. We inquire next whether peti-
tioner has a cause of action to assert this right. 
B 
It is clear that the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U. S. C. § 1331 (a) to consider petitioner's claim. Bell v. 
Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946). It is equally clear, a.nd the 
-en bane Court of Appeals so held, that the Fifth Amendment 
confers on petitioner a constitutional right to be free from 
'illegal discrimination.11 Yet the Cour of A . Jeals cone! ded 
that etitioner could not enforce this rigl1t ·bee u~ she I c ed 
a~1. T e meaning o t is missing "cause .of 
action," however, is far from apparent. 
Almost half a century ago Justice Cardozo rec0gnized that 
a "'cause of action' may mean one thing for one purpose and 
something different for another." Vnited States v. Memphis 
11 The restraints of tlw Fifth Amendment reach far enough to t>mbrace 
the official actions of a Congrrssman in hiring and dismis~ing his em-
ployees. That respondent's conduct may l1ave been illegal does not suffice 
to trans-form it into merely private action. "[P]ower, once granted, docs 
not disappear like a magic gift wl1en it is wrongfully used." Bivens, 
supra, at 392. See Ilome Telephone and Telegraph Co. 1V. Los Angeles. 
1.27 u.s. 278,287-289 (1913). 
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Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 67-68 (1933).12 The phrase 
apparently became a legal term of art when the New York 
Code of 1848 abolished the distinction between actions at law 
and suits in equity and simply required a plaintiff to include 
in his complaint "[a] statement of the facts constituting the 
cause of action .... " 13 New York Code of Practice in Civil 
Actions § 120 (2) ( 1848). By the first third of the 20th 
century, however, the phrase had become so encrusted with 
doctrinal complexity that the authors of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure eschewed it altogether, requiring only that a 
complaint contain 1'a sh'O;ta;a p~ statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. Rule Civ. 
Proc. 8 (a). See Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, 
Inc., 133 F. 2d 187, 189 (CA2 1943). Nevertheless, courts and 
commentators have continued to use the phrase "cause of 
action" in the traditional sense established by the Codes to 
refer roughly to the alleged invasion of "recognized lega:l 
rights" upon which a litigant bases his claim for relief.H 
Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 
682, 693 (1949). 
12 See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 748 (1947); Arnold, 
The Code 'Cause of Action' Clarified by United States Supreme Court, 19 
A. B. A. J. 215 ( 1933). 
13 See Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 Yale L. J. 817, 820 (1924); 
Blume, The Scope of a Civil Action, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 257 (1943). 
14 See, e. g., United States v. Employing Plasterers Association, 347 U. S. 
186 (1954); 2A Moore's Federal Practice ~ 8.13, at 1704-1705 ("Perhaps 
it is not entirely accurate to say, as one court ba::; said, that ' it is only 
necessary to state a claim in the pleading::i . .. and not a cause of action.' 
While the Hules have substituted 'claim' or 'claim for relief' in lieu of the 
older and troublesome term 'cause of action,' the pleading still must state 
a 'cause of action' in the sense that it mu8t slww 'that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.' It is not enough to indicate merely that the plaintiff 
has a grievance but sufficient detail must be given so that the defendant, 
and the court, can obtain a fair idea of what the plaintiff is complaining, 
and can sec that here is some legal basis for recovery.") (footnotes 
' 'Omitted). 
There was, of C011rsc, great controversy concerning the exact meaning 
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This is not the meaning of the "cause of action" which the 
'Court of Appeals below refused to imply from the Fifth 
Amendment, however, for the Court acknowledged that peti-
tioner had alleged an invasion of her constitut:onal right to 
be free from illegal discrimination.1 " Instead the Court of 
Appeals appropriated the meaning of the phrase "cause of 
action" used in the many cases in which this Court has parsed 
congressional enactments to determine whether the rights and 
obligations so created could be judicially enforced by a par-
ticular "class of litigants." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 
- U. S. -, - (1979). Securities Investor Protection 
'Corp. (SIPC) v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975), for example, 
·held that although ''Congress' primary purpose in . . . cre-
ating the SIPC was ... the protection of investors," and 
although investors were thus "the intended beneficiaries of the 
·[Securities Investor Protection] Act [of 1970] ," 84 Stat. 1635, 
15 U. S. C. § 78aaa et seq., investors nevertheless had no 
private cause of action judicially to compel SIPC "to commit 
its funds or otherwise to act for the protection" of investors. 
!d., at 418, 421. · We hela that under the Act only the 
· Securities and Exchange Commission had a cause of action 
enabling it to invoke judicial authority to · require SIPC .t() 
' Qf the phrase "cause of action" in the Codes. See id ., at § 2.06, p. 35Q 
n. 26; J. Pomeroy, Code Hcmrdies 459-466 (4th ed. 1904); Wheaton, The 
' Code 'Cause of Action': Its Definition, '22 Corn. L. Q: 1 (1936); Clark, 
wpra n. 13, at 837. 
15 The Court of Appeals apparently found ·t11at petitioner Jacked a 
· '"cause of action" in the sense t1~ a cause of action would have been 
·supplied by 42 U. S. C. §"1983. Chapman v. Ho·uston Welfare Right'S 
Org.,- U.S.- (1979), holds this Term that, although§ 1983 serves 
"to ensure that an individual [ha~l a cause of action for violations of the 
Constitution," the statutr itself ''does not provide any substantive rights I . [ 
at all." /d ., at -. Section 198;3, of cour~c, provides a c:m.;e of action} . .A....~ , 
·only for deprivations of constitutional right:; that occur "under color :5 ,.,.r rn . 
·of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .or 
'Territory,, an<il tlrus has no application to .this case. 
l 
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perform its statutory obligations. On the other hand, Texas 
& N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 
281 U. S. 548 (1930). held that ~ 2 of the Railway Labor Act 
of 1926, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U. S. C. § 152, which provides that 
railroad employees be able to designate representatives "with-
out interference. influence, or coercion. ' ' did not confer 
111nerely an abstract right." but was judicially enforceable 
through a private cause of action.16 !d., at 558, 567- 568. 
In cases such as these, the question is which class of liti-
gants may enforce in court legislatively created rights or 
obligations. If a litigant is an appropriate party to invoke 
the power of the courts, it is said that he has a 11cause of 
action" under the statute, and that this cause of action is a 
·necessary clement of his "claim." So understood, the question 
) 
whether a litigant has a "cause of action" is analytically 
distinct and prior to the question of \vhat relief, if any, a 
litigant may be entitled to receive. The concept of a "cause 
of action" is employed specifically to determine who may 
judicially enforce the statutory rights or obligations.17 
16 Texas & N. 0. R . Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 
supra, is now understood as having implied a "cause of action" alt hough 
the opinion it self did not u~c the phrase . See Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, supra, at - n . 13. 
17 Thus it may be said that jurisdiction is a question of whether a federal 
court has the power, under the Constitution or laws o"f the United States, 
to hear a case, see Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry . Co. v. 
8-u·an, 111 U. S. 379 , 384 (1884) ; j\Jontana-Dakota Utilities Co . v. 
Northwestern Public Service Co ., 341 U. S. 246, 249 ( 1951) ; standing is 
a question of whether a plaintiff is sufficiently adversary to a defendant 
to create an Art. III case or controversy , or a t least to overcome pruden-
tial limitations on federal court jurisdiction, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 . 
U. S. 490, 498 (1975); cause of action is a question of whether a particu-
lar plaintiff is a member of the clas::; of litigants tha t may, as a matter 
of law, appropria tely invoke the power of the court ; and relief is a ques-
tion of the various remedies a federal court may make available. A 
plaintiff may have a cause of action evC'n though he be entitled to no 
relief at all, as, for example, when a defendant in a suit for damages is 
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It is in this sense that the Court of Appeals concluded that 
petitioner lacked a cause of action. The Court of Appeals 
reached this conclusion through the application of the criteria 
set out in Cart v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), for ascertaining 
whether a private cause of action may be implied from "a 
statute not expressly providing one." /d., at 78.18 The Court 
of Appeals used these criteria to determine that those in 
petitioner's position should not be able to enforce the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause, and that petitioner there-
fore had no cause of action under the Amendment. This was 
error, for the question of who may enforce a statutory right is 
·clothed with absolute immunity . See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 
(1978). 
The Court of Appeals appea red to confuse the question of whether peti-
tioner had standing with the question of whether she had asserted a proper 
cause of action. See National Railroad Passeuger Corp. v. National Asso-
ciation of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 465 n. 13 (1974). Although 
the Court acknowledged the existence of petitioner's con:stitutional right, 
571 F . 2d, at 797-798, it concluded that she had no cause of action in 
part because "the injury alleged here does not infringe this right as 
directly as the injury inflicted in the unreasonable se:.~rch of Webster 
Bivens offended the fourth amendment." /d. , at 797. The nature of 
petitioner's injury, however , is relevant to the determination of whether 
she has "alleged such a per~onal stake in the outcome of the controversy 
as to assure that concrete adver:seness which sharpens the presentation of 
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of diffi-
cult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962) . 
See Duke Power Co. \'. Carolina Environmental Study Group. Inc. , 438 
U. S. 59, 72 (1978). And under the criteria we havr :set out, prtitioner 
clearly has standing to bring thi:s suit. If the allegations of her complaint 
are taken to be true, shr has :shown that :;he "personally has ~uffered :some 
actual or thrrate~d injury a::; a rr;;ult of tlJC putatively illega l conduct of 
the defend:wt." Gladstvue Realtors v. Village of BellCoovd. - U. S. -, 
- (19711) Whethrr petitioner has assertrd a cause of action, however, 
depend:> ~n th<· quality or extent of her injury, but on whether thr 
clas:; of li 1;:;ants of which petitioner i ~ a member may u~r the courts to 
enforc<· thl' right at i s~ue . The foc11:; mu:;t therefore be on the nature of 
the right petitioner as~erts . 
ts See n. 8, ~upra. 
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fundamentally different than the question of who may enforce 
a right that is protected by tl1e Constitution. 
Statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress, 
and it is entirely appropriate for Congress, in c,,:eating these 
rights and obligatio11s, to determine in addition who may 
enforce them and in what manner. For example, statutory 
rights and obligations are often elnbedded in complex regula-
tory schemes, so that if they are not enforced through private 
causes of action, they may nevertheless be enforced through 
alternative mechanisms, such as criminal prosecutions, see 
Cort v. Ash, supra, or other public ca'Uses of actions. See 
:Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, supra; Na-
tionlzl Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of 
Railroad Passengers, supra, at 457. In eacl1 case, how~ver, 
the question is the nature of the legisla'tlve intent informing 
a specific statute, and Cort set out the criteria through which 
this intent could be disc~
The Constitution, on the other hand, does not "partake of 
the prolixity of a legal code." M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 
Wheat. 316, 407 (1819). lt speaks instead with a majestic 
simplicity. One of "its important objec'ts,·" ibid., is the desig-
nation of rights. And in "its great outlines," ibid., the 
judiciary is clearly discernible as the primary means through 
which these rights may be enforced. As james Madison 
'stated when he presented the ·Bill of R'ights to the Congress: 
"If [these rights] are incorporated into the Constitution, 
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves 
in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they 
will be an impenetrable ·bulwark against every assump-
tion of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will 
be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights 
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the dec-
laration of rights." 1 Annals of Congress 439 (Gales & 
Seaton, eds. 1834). 
At least in the absci\ce of "a textually demonstrable 
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constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate 
political department." Ba.ker v. Carr, supra, at 217, we pre~ 
sume that justiciable constitutional rights are to · be en~ 
forced through the courts. And, unless such rights are te 
become merely precatory, the class of those litigants who 
allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated, 
and who at the same time have no effective means other than 
the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke 
the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of 
their justiciable constitutional rights. "The very essence of 
civil liberty," wrote Chief ·Justice Marshall in Marl.Yury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137. 163 (1803) , "certainly consists in the 
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, 
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of 
government is to afford that protection." Traditionally, 
therefore, "it is established practice for this Court to sustain 
the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect 
rights safeguarded by the Constitution and to restrain indi-
vidual state officers from doing what the 14th Amendment 
forbids the State to do." Bell v. Hood, supra, at 684. See 
Bivens, supra, at 400 (Harlan. J., concurring in judgment). 
Indeed, this Court has already settled that a cause of action 
may be implied directly under the Equal Protection Com-
ponent of the Due Proces Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment in favor of those who seek to enforce this constitutional 
right.19 The plaintiffs in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 
(1954), for example, claimed that they had been refused 
admission into certain public schools in the District of Colum-
bia solely on account of their race. They rested their suit 
directly on the Fifth Amendment and on the general federal 
question jurisdiction of the district courts, 28 U. S. C. § 1331. 
19 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933), held that a plaintiff wh0o 
alleged that his properly had been taken by the United States for public 
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The District Court dismissed their complaint for failure "to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. Rule 
Civ. Proc. 12 (b)(6). This Court reversed. Plaintiffs were 
clearly the appropriate parties to bring such a suit, and this 
Court held that equitable relief should be made available. 
349 u.s. 294 (1955). 
Like the plaintiffs in Bolling v. Sharpe, supra, petitioner 
rests her claim directly on the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. She claims that her rights under the 
Amendment have been violated, and that she has no effective 
means other than the judiciary to vindicate these rights. 20 
2° CJa.use 9 of Rule XLIII of the House of Representatives prohibits sex 
discrimination as part of the Code of Official Conduct of the House: 
"A l\lrmbC'r, officer, or employ('(' of the Hou~e of Hrpre ' entativrs shall 
not discharge or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwi. e di~criminate 
against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin." 
Clause 9 was adopted on January 14, 1975, see 121 Cong. Rec . 22, 
approximately six months aftrr petitioner's discharge. In 1977 the House 
Commission on Administrative Review (the "Obey Commission") termed 
"the anti-discrimination provisions of Rule XLIII ... all but unenforce-
able." Commission on Administrative Review, R ecommendations and 
Rationales Concerning Admini ·t rative Units and Work l\Ianagement, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 53 (Comm. Print. 1977). The Commi~sion recommended 
the establishment of a Fair Employment Practices Panel to provide non-
binding conciliation in cases of allrged violations of Clause 9. See H. R. 
Res. 766, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 504 (1977); Commission on Adminis-
trative Review, supra, at 52-5:3. This proposal was prcvrnted from reach-
ing the House floor, howe\'er, when the House defeated the Rule which 
would have govemed ron idrration of the Obey Commission's resolution. 
See 123 Cong. Rec. Hl0819-28 (Oct. 12 , 1977) . 
On September 25, 1978. H. R . He!>. 1380 was introduced calling for the 
implementation of Clause 9 through the creation of "a House Fair 
Employment Hclat10n~ Board, a Hou:se Fair Employmrnt Relation ~ Office, 
and procedures for hranng and ::;cttling complaints alleging violations of 
Clause 9 of Rule XLIII .... " II . R Res. 1:380, 95th Cong., 2d Scss., 
§ 2 (1978) . H. R. RP:;. 13~0 wa;; referred to the House Committeps on 
Administration and Hulcs, where it apparently langui:shrd. SrP 124 Cong. 
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We conclude, therefore, that she is an appropriate party to 
invoke the general federal question jurisdiction of the District 
Court to seek relief. She has a cause of action under the 
Fifth Amendment.21 
Although petitioner has a cause of action, her complaint 
might nevertheless be dismissed under Rule 12 (b)(6) unless 
it can be determined that judicial relief is available. We 
therefore proceed to consider whether a damages remedy is ~n 
· appropriate form of relief, --- ' C 
We approach this inquiry on the basis of established law. 
"[I]t is o o o well settled that where legal rights have been 
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to 
· sue for such invasion, federal courts ma.y use any available 
remedy to make good the wrong·done." Bell v. Hood, supra, 
at 684. Bivens, supra, holds that in appropriate circumstances 
a federal district court may provide relief in damages for the 
violation of constitutional rights if there are "no special factors 
· Rec. H10697 (Sept. 25, ' 1978) . The House failed to consider it before 
adjournment. 
There presently exi~ts a volnnt ary House Fair Employment Practices 
Agreement. Members of the House who have signed the Agreement elect 
a House Fair Employmrnt Practices Committee, which has authority. to 
investigate cases of alleged di:;crimination among participating f\lembers. 
The Committee has no enforcement powers. 
· 21 Five Courts of Appeals have implied causes of action directly under 
the Fifth Amendmrnt. Sec Apton v. Wilson, 165 U. S. App. D. C. 22, 
506 F. 2d 83 (1974); Sullivan v. Murphy, 15G U. S. App. D. C. 28, 478 
F. 2d 938 (1973); United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F. 2d 892 
(CA3 1972); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F. 2d 1291 (CA4 1978), cert. pending 
sub nom. Moffit v. Loe, No. 78-1260; State Marine · Lines, Inc . v. Shultz, 
498 F. 2d 1146 (CA4 1974); Green v. Carlson, 581 F. 2d 669 (CA7 1978), 
cert. pending, No. 78-1261; Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional. Planni11(J Agency, 
· 566 F. 2d 1353 (CA9 1977), rever:;ed in part and affirmed in part on 
other ground:; sub tWill. Lake Country Estates, /uc. v. Tahue llegiuual 
Planning Agency, - U. S. - (19i9); Bennet v. Campbell, 5G4 F. 2d 
329 (CA9 19i7). 
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counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by 
Congress." !d., at 3DG. Sec Butz v. Economou, supra, at 504. 
First, a damages remedy is surely appropriate in this case. 
"Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary 
remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." 
Bivens, supra, at 395. Relief in damages would be judicially 
manageable, for the case presents a focused remedial issue 
without difficult questions of valuation or causation. See id., 
at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). Litigation under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has given federal 
courts great experience evaluating claims for backpay due to 
illegal sex discrimination. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (g). 
Moreover, since respondent is no longer a Congressman, see 
n. 1, supra, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement would 
be unavailing. And there are available no other alternative 
forms of relief. For Davis, as for Bivens, "it is damages or 
nothing." 22 Bivens, supra, at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
Second, there are in this case "no special factors counselling 
hesitation." "[F] ederal fiscal policy," for example, is not 
implicated. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 
311 (1947). · And, although the defendant in this suit was, at 
the time petitioner's complaint was filed , a United States 
Congressman, we apply the principle that "legislators ..• ·
22 Respondent does not dispute petitioner's claim that she "has no cause 
of action under Loui~iana law." Brief for Petitioner 19. See 3 Empl. 
Prac. Guide (CCH) ,f 23,548 (Ang. 1978). And it is far from clear that 
a state court would have authority to effect n, damages remedy against a 
United States Congrcs~man for illegal actions in the course of his official 
conduct, even if a plaintiff's claim were grounded in 1 he United States 
Constitution. See Tarble's Case, ·13 Wall . :397 (1871). Deference to 
state court adjudication in a case such as l11is would in any event not serve 
the purposes of federali~m, since it involves the applicntion of the Fift11 
Amendment to a federal ofTicer in the cour~e of hi:> federal duties. It is 
therefore particularly appropriate that a federal court be the forum in 
which a damages remedy be awarded. 
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ought generally to be bound by [the law] as are ordinary 
persons." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 (1972). 
Cf. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 320 (1973). As Butz v.' 
Economou stated only last Term : 
"Our system of jurisprudence rests on the assumption 
that all individuals, whatever their position in govern-
ment, are subject to federal law: 
"'No man in this country is so high that he is above the 
law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance 
with impunity. All officers of the government, from the 
highest to the lowest. arc creatures of the law, and are 
bound to obey it. ' United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. [ 196,] 
220 [ ( 1882)] ." 438 P. S., at 506 
Third, there is in this case "no explicit congressional declara-
tion that persons" in petitioner's j)osit~n injured by unconsti-
tutional federal employment discrimination "may not recover 
money damages from" those responsible for the injury. 
Bivens, supra, at 397. (Emphasis supplied.) While such_ a 
declaration would not nece saril be bindin on this Court, it 
wo e a factor to consider in etermimng w at relief iS 
a~e Court of Appeals apparently interpreted 
§ 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 86 Stat. 
111, 42 U.S. C.§ 2000e-16. as an explicit congressional prohibi-
tion against judicial remedies for those in petitioner's position. 
When § 717 was added to Title VII to protect federal em- -
ployees from discrimination , it failed to extend this protection 
to congressional employees such as petitioner who are not in 
the competitive service."~ See 42 l!. S. C. ~ 2000e-16 (a). 
There is no evidence, however. that Congtess mean.t,. § 71.1..to 
foreclose a lten.;t'ive .remedies available to those not covere 
23 Since petitioner was not in the competitive service, sec n. 2 supra, 
the remedial provisions of § 717 of Title VII are not availablr to her. In. 
Brown v. General Ser vices Ad111inistrativn , 425 U.S. 820 (197G), wr held 
that the rrmcdir~ pro,·idcd by § 717 arc exclu:sive for tho~c federal rm~ · 
ployces co\'crcd by the ::; ta.tulc. 
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by the statute. Such silence is far from "the clearly discern-
ible will of Congress" perceived by the Court of Appeals. 571 
F. 2d, at 800. And we are particularly loathe to read this 
silence as a prohibition of all judicial relief for respondent's al-
leged violation of petitioner 's Fifth Amendment right, because, 
so interpreted. § 717 \vould "practically ... deny the right." 
Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 457 (1904). The "right would 
be sacrificed or obliterated if it were without ... remedy .... " 
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 207 
(1944). This interpretation of§ 717 would raise serious ques-
tions concerning its constitutionality. See Brinkerhoff-Faris 
1'rust & Savings Co. v. Hill , 281 U. S. 673, 682 (1930); cf. 
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 , 366-367 (1974). In such 
cases "'it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first 
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly pos-
sible by which the [constitutional] question [s] may be ) 
avoided.' Crowell v. B enson , 2851!. S. 22. 62 ( 1932) ." United 
States\'. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363. 369 (1971). 
See National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of ' 
Chicago, - U. S. -, - (1979). \Ve therefore do not 
inter )ret § 717 to foreclose the availabilit of a damages 
remedy to 1ose m petitioner's positwn. 
Ff:1ally, the Court of Appeals appeared concerned that, if a. 
damages remedy were made available to petitioner, the danger 
existed <~of deluging federal courts with claims ... .'' 571 
F. 2d, at 800. \Ve do 110t perceive the potential for such 
a deluge. By virtue of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, a damages remedy 
is already available to redress injuries such as petitioner's 
when they occur under color of state law. Moreover, a plain-
tiff seeking a damages remedy under the Constitution must 
first demonstrate that his constitutional rights have been 
violated. We do not hold that every tort by a federal official 
may be redressed in damages. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 
·u. S. 647 (1963). And, of course, were Congress to create 
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relief might be obviated. See Bivens, supra, at 397. But 
perhaps the most fundamental answer to the concerns ex-
pressed by the Court of Appeals is that provided by Justice 
Harlan concurring in Biven: 
"Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly 
scarce these days. Nonetheless, when we automatically 
close the courthouse door solely on this basis, we im-
plicitly express a value judgment on the comparative 
importance of classes of legally protected interests. And 
current limitations upon the effective functioning of the 
courts arising from budgetary inadequacies should not be 
permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of other-
wise sound constitutional principles." 403 U. S., at 411. 
We conclude, therefore, that in this case, a.s in Bivens, if 
petitioner is able to prevail on the merits, she should be able 
to redress her injury in damages, a 11remedial mechanism 
normally available in the federal courts." Bivens, supra, at 
397. 
III 
We hold today that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, en bane, must be reversed because petitioner has a 
cause of action under the Fifth Amendment, and because her 
injury may be redressed by a damages remedy. The Court of 
Appeals did not consider, however, whether respondent's con-
duct was shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause of the 
Constitution. Accordingly, we do not reach this question. 
And, of course, we express no opinion as to the merits of 
petitioner's· complaint. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
o.~inion •. . 
So ordered. 
.§u:pr.tnu Qfettrl qf t4.t 'J!lnit.t~ ~htf.tg ~~ 
)Jmrlfinghm. ~. <!f. 2!1,?'!' ~ 
CH"MBERS OF" 
JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~~~J/'.5 




Re: 78-5072 - Davis v. Passman 
Dear Bill: 
My apologies for being so slow in responding to your 
letter of April 23, 1979. Frankly, I have vacillated a good 
deal in my consideration of the Speech or Debate Clause 
problem, and now have an opinion that is different from the one 
I expressed at the Conference on April 20. 
Logically there are at least three different ways in which 
the Speech or Debate Clause might be applied to a congressman's 
employment practices; (1) that all staff decisions are 
protected, because even file clerks and messengers may 
occasionally be called upon to perform confidential and 
important functions, or be in training for greater 
responsibilities and because any attempt to decide which 
employees are covered and which are not would itself involve 
the kind of questioning the Clause was intended to avoid; (2) 
that only the hiring, promotion, and discharge of employees who 
function within the sphere of 1eg5timate ~egislative activity 
are protected; or (3) that the Clause has no application at a11 
to employment practices. 
Your draft opinion--consistentJy with the assumption made 
by the parties--decides that the second interpretation is the 
correct one. For two reasons I am troubJed about making that 
decision now. First, I do not think we have had the issue 
ad~quately argued; second, the very inquiry into the kind of 
duties that Davis did perform--or would perform if she had 
received her expected promotion--involves the kind of inquiry 
into legislators' activities that the constitutional privilege 
l
may have sought to prevent. To avoid that kind of inquiry, it 
may be more consistent with the purposes of the Clause to adopt 
either the first or the third of the alternatives I have just 
identified. 
As of now, if the Speech or Debate issue is to be remanded 
to the Fifth Circuit, I believe that court should be free to 
decide the question on an entirely clean slate. I wouJd l ~~~~~~o~~i~~=~e~r=~t~":it t_?.:.!ul ,_~~ ?_ eJ.Jour 





Admittedly, such an omission would magnify the tension 
between this case and Proxmire. Nevertheless, I think there 
are valid reasons for dec1d1ng the cause of action issue first 
in this case. No matter how we approach the .case, the decision 
of one question will avoid, or at least postpone, the ·decision 
of another difficult constitutional question. For me the 
answer to the cause of action question is clearl controll d by 
Bivens whereas e peec o e a e question remains doubtful. 
j4fherefore-am comi or EaSte i n oec1 a 1ng the cause of actton 
question first. Moreover, notwithstanding the des~rabi1ity of 
having a defense based on the Speech or Debate Clause terminate 
the litigation immediately, that is not possible in this case 
if there must be discovery into the character of Davis' 
duties. As a purudential matter in this case I am therefore 
\
prepared to join the Bivens holding and to postpone the entire 
Speech and Debate Clause question until the Fifth Circuit has 
decided it. 
' 
I have these additional problems with your opinion: 
a. Page 6 n. 9: Could you omit the last sentence of 
the footnote? 
b. Page 17: I am not sur.e it is quite accurate to 
say flatly that there are "no special factors 
counseling hesitation" in this case. For me, the 
respect that one coordinate branch of government owes 
to another is such a special factor. I am persuaded, 
however, that this factor--to the extent that it is 
relevant--is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause 
as well as the possibility of a qualified immunity if 
that Clause does not apply in any event. I think this 
point may need a little more explication. 
c. Pages 18-19. I have two questions about the 
treatment of § 717. In my opinion the most important 
reason § 717 does not defeat Davis' claim is that the 
statute was not intended to displace any remedy that 
previously existed: it neither adds to nor subtracts 
from whatever Bivens-type claim Davis has. I do not 
agree that an explicit congressional determination 
that Davis may not recover money damages "would not 
necessarily be binding on this Court" (see page 18): 
nor do I agree that such an "interpretation of § 717 
would raise serious questions concerning its 
constitutionality." See page 19. 
- 3 -
Finally, I wonder if it is necessary, at the end of the 
opinion, expressly to save the question whether Passman may 
have the qualified immunity identified in your footnote 7. 
Respectfully 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
I I 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
3 rU"" v'-()./' 
~ ~ tLvJ 
~ "'~ 
.itqtunu Qfllltrl o-f f4t ~ ;§hd.tg 
~as'lritt!lhm. ~. "f. 2.ll.;t'!' 
May 9, 1979 
b .. ~ )sli ~~ Re: _7_8_-_5_0_7_2_- _ D_a_v_i_s_v_._P_a_s_s_m_a_n 
~ Dear Bill: 
~oJl) My apologies for being so slow in responding to your 
letter of April 23, 1979. Frankly, I have vacillated a good 
deal in my consideration of the Speech or Debate Clause 
problem, and now have an opinion that is different from the one 
I expressed at the Conference on April 20. 
Logically there are at least three different ways in which 
the Speech or Debate Clause might be applied to a congressman's 
employment practices~ (1) that all staff decisions are 
protected, because even file clerks and messengers may 
occasionally be called upon to perform confidential and 
important functions, or be in training for greater 
responsibilities and because any attempt to decide which 
employees are covered and which are not would i tse 1_f involve 
the kind of questioning the Clause was intended to avoid; (2) 
that only the hiring, promotion, and discharge of employees who 
function within the sphere of 1eg5timate ~egislative activity 
are protected~ or (3) that the Clause has no application at all 
to employment practices. 
Your draft opinion--consistently with the assumption made 
by the parties--decides that the second interpretation is the 
correct one. For two reasons I am troubled about making that 
decision now. First, I do not think we have had the issue 
adequately argued; second, the very inquiry into the kind of 
duties that Davis did perform--or would perform if she had 
received her expected promotion--invoJves the kind of jnquiry 
into legislators' activities that the constitutional privilege 
may have sought to prevent. To avoid that kind of inquiry, jt 
may be more consistent with the purposes of the Clause to adopt 
either the first or the third of the alternatives I have just 
identified. 
As of now, if the Speech or Debate issue is to be remanded 
to the Fifth Circuit, I believe that court should be free to 
decide the question on an entirely clean slate. I wouJd 
therefore prefer to omit the full paragraph on page 7 of your 
second printed draft. 
r 
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Admittedly, such an omission would magnify the tension 
between this case and Proxmire. Nevertheless, I think there 
are valid reasons for dec1d1ng the cause of action issue first 
in this case. No matter how we approach the .case, the decision 
of one question will avoid, or at least postpone, the decision 
of another difficult constitutional question. For me the 
answer to the cause of action question is clearly controlled by 
Bivens whereas the Speech or Debate question remains doubtful. 
I therefore am comfortable in deciding the cause of action 
question first. Moreover, notwithstanding· the desirability of 
having a defense based on the Speech or Debate Clause terminate 
the litigation immediately, that is not possible in this case 
if there must be discovery into the character of Davis' 
duties. As a purudential matter in this case I am therefore 
prepared to join the Bivens holding and to postpone the entire 
Speech and Debate Clause question until the Fifth Circuit has 
decided it. 
I have these additional problems with your opinion: 
a. Page 6 n. 9: Could you omit the last sentence of 
the footnote? 
b. Page 17: I am not sure· it is quite accurate to 
say flatly that there are "no special factors 
counseling hesitation" in this case. For me, the 
respect that one coordinate branch of government owes 
to another is such a special factor. I am persuaded, 
however, that this factor--to the extent that it is 
relevant--is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause 
as well as the possibility of a qualified immunity if 
that Clause does not apply in any event. I think this 
point may need a little more explication. 
c. Pages 18-19. I have two questions about the 
···--·treatment of § 717. In my opinion the most important 
reason § 717 does not defeat Davis' claim is that the 
statute was not intended to displace any remedy that 
previously existed; it neither adds to nor subtracts 
from whatever Bivens-type claim Davis has. I do not 
agree that an explicit congressional determination 
that Davis may not recover money damages "would not 
necessarily be binding on this Court" (see page 18); 
nor do I agree that such an "interpretation of § 717 
would raise serious questions concerning its 
constitutionality." See page 19. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~.u:.prnn:r ~.~tlflttt 1ft ur.t ·~a ;!itattg 
~ufri:nghtn, ~. <!f. 20c?'!.:3 
May 11, 1979 
Re: 78-5072 - Davis v. Passman 
Dear Bill: 
I am not ready to circulate a dissent in this case. 
However, I write now to caution a possible conflict with 
Helstoski if we indicate that the Speech or Debate Clause 
is expansive enough to protect a Member's hiring 
decisions. Surely nothing in any prior decision gives 
hint that the Clause is to be read so broadly. Indeed, 
the Conference majority in Helstoski and in Proxmire calls 
for a narrower reading. That, I understand fully, is why 
you will dissent in Proxmire. You have not finally 
indicated whether you will participate in Helstoski. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
May 14, 1~79 
7R-507~ Davis v. Pas~~an 
PlPase ioin mo in your dissenting opinion . 
J have b~en ~orkinq on a separate dissent that T 
hooe will buttress vour views . r hope to rirculate it before 
the week is out. 
The Chief Justice 
Cooi~s to the Conferenre 
LFP/lab 
lfp/ss 5/14/79 
No; - 78-5072 -Davis v; Passman 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting 
Although I join the opinion of the Chief 
Justice, I write separately to emphasize that no 
prior decision of this Court justifies today•s 
intrusion upon the legitimate powers of Members of 
Congress. 
The Court's analysis starts with the 
general proposition that "the judiciary is clearly 
discernible as the primary means through which 
[constitutional] rights may be enforced ... Ante, at 
13. It leaps from this generalization to the 
conclusion that an individual who has suffered an 
injury to a constitutionallly protected interest, 
and who lacks an 11 effective" alternative, 11 must be 
able to invoke 11 federal court jurisdiction to 
vindicate his "justiciable constitutional rights ... 
Id., at 14. (emphasis supplied). Apart from the 
dubious logic of this reasoning, I know of no 
precedent of this Court that supports such an 
absolute statement of the federal judiciary's 
obligation to entertain private suits that Congress 
has not authorized. On the contrary, I have 
2. 
thought it clear that federal courts must exercise 
a principled discretion when called upon to infer a 
private cause of action directly from the language 
of the Constitution. In the present case, for 
reasons summarized~ ~by the Chief Justice, 
principles of comity and separation of powers 
should require a federal court to stay its hand. 
To be sure, it has been clear - at least 
since Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) -that in appropriate 
circumstances private causes of action may be 
'f df .. f h c .. -ti 1n erre rom prov1s1ons o t e onst1tut1on. a 
) . *Paul: Here, include in a note the substance of the 
f1rst couple of sentences on page 2 of your draft 
citing Cannon and noting the difference between 
inferring from provisions of the Constitution and 
inferring from a statute. I think it unwise for me 
to put my Cannon dissent in a prominent position in 
the next of this opinion. 
~~ Moreover, the federal courts have a 
greater responsibilty under the Constitution for 
the protection of rights derived directly from it 
than for the definition and enforcement of rights 
created solely by Congress. Id., at 407 (Harlan, 
J., concurring). But the exercise of this 
3. 
responsibility involves discretion, and a weighing 
of relevant concerns. As Mr. Justice Harlan stated 
in Bivens, addressing this point, ~ the Court 
should "take into account [a range of policy 
considerations] at least as broad as the range of 
those a legislature would consider with respect to 
an express statutory authorization of a traditional 
z. 
remedy." Id. , at __ • JB./ 
Among the relevant policy consideration 
that a court certainly should consider in deciding 
whether to imply a constitutional right of action 
is that of comity toward an equal and coordinate 
branch of government. As Chief Justice Waite 
observed over a century ago, "One branch of 
government cannot encroach on the domain of another 
without danger. The safety of our institutions 
depends in no small degree on a strict observance 
4. 
of this salutary rule." Sinking Fund C~ses, 9 Otto 
700, 718 (1878). Even where the authority of one 
branch over a matter is not exclusive, so that a 
federal court properly may accept jurisdiction over 
the dispute, we have recognized that the principle 
of separation of powers continues to have force as 
a matter of policy. For example, in United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), we held on the one 
hand that the question whether the President had a 
claim of privilege as to conversations with his 
advisers was an issue to be resolved by the 
judiciary, and on the other hand that separation-
of-powers considerations required the recognition 
of a qualified privilege. A similar approach 
should govern here. 
Whether or not the employment decisions of 
a member of Congress fall within the scope of the 
Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, it is 
clear that these decisions are intimately related 
to the conduct of his duties. As the Chief Justice . 
b '1 1'~ o serves, ~' a congressman necessar1 y re 1esAon 
~~~ ~ 
h . 1 ff . d. h . \... ~ ~ of 1s persona sta 1n 1sc arg1ng ~  
r~sibi~ities. Because of the nature of his 
5. 
office, he must rely to an extraordinary degree on 
the loyalty and compatibility of everyone who works 
for him. Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 377-388 
(1976) (Powell, J., dissenting). A 
congressman simply cannot perform his 
constitutional duties effectively, or serve his 




The foregoing would seem self evident 
~. 
even if Congress had not clearly indicated an 
intention to reserve to its members the rightf to 
select, employ and discharge staff personnel. But 
Congress unmistakably has made clear its view on 
this subject. It took pains to exempt itself from 
'S 
the coverage of Title VII~ Unless the Court is 
abandoning or modifying sub silentio our holding in 
Brown v. ~eneral Services Administration, 425 U.S. 
820 (1976), that Title VII as amended "provides the 
exclusive judicial remedy for claims of 
discrimination in federal employment," id., at 835, 
the exemption from this statute for congressional 
employees should bar all judicial relief. 
In sum, the decision of the Court today 
is not an exercise of principled discretion. Its 
opinion does not take into account the range of 
policy and constitutional considerations that we 
would expect a legislature to ~in 
~~ 
determining whether a statutory remedy should be 
A 
enacted. The princip~ of comity and the 
6. 
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers are 
~~f~· 
·- ) Indeed, in my view, the intrusion 
upon and the limiting of the traditional authority 
of a member of Congress to choose his own staff 
simply cannot be justified.~ 
¥ *The justification ~OR~the Court is that 
it is the duty of courts to vindicate 
constitutional rights - a duty no one disputes. 
But it has never been thought that this duty 
required a blind exercise of judicial power without 
regard to other interests or constitutional 
principles. Indeed, it would not be unnatural for 
the Congress to consider today's intrusion to be 
wholly unwarranted, and to exercise its authority 
to reassert the proper balance between the 
legislative and judicial branches. If the reaction 
took the form of limiting the jurisdiction of 
federal courts this conceivably could frustrate the 
vindication of rights that properly are protected 
by the court. 
lfp/ss 5/14/79 
No; - 78~5072 - Davis v. Passman 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting 
Although I join the opinion of the Chief 
Justice that focuses on the serious constitutional 
error of the Court's opinion, I write separately to 
emphasize that no prior decision of this Court 
justifies today's intrusion upon the legitimate 
powers of Members of Congress. 
The Court's analysis starts with the 
general proposition that "the judiciary is clearly 
discernible as the primary means through which 
[constitutional] rights may be enforced." ~, at 
13. It leaps from this generalization to the 
declaration that an individual who has suffered to 
a constitutionallly protected interest, and who 
lacks an "effective" alternative, "must be able to 
invoke" federal court jurisdiction to vindicate his 
"justiciable constitutional rights". Id., at 14. 
(emphasis supplied). Apart from any defect in the 
logic of this reasoning from the general to the 
specific, I know of no prior precedent of this 
Court that supports such an absolute statement of 
the federal judiciary's obligation to entertain 
2. 
private suits that Congress has not authorized. On 
the contrary, I have thought it clear that federal 
courts must exercise a principled discretion when 
called upon to infer a private cause of action 
directly from the language of the Constitution. In 
the present case, for reasons summarized so well by 
the Chief Justice, principles of comity and 
separation of powers should require a federal court 
to stay its hand. 
To be sure, it has been clear - at least 
since Bivens v. Six - unknown Federal Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) -that in appropriate 
circumstances private causes of action may be 
inferred from provisions of the Constitution.* 
*Or, here, include in a note the substance of the 
first couple of sentences on page 2 of your draft 
citing Cannon and noting the difference between 
inferring _from provisions of the Constitution and 
inferring from a statute. I think it unwise for me 





No; - 78~son - oavis · v; Passma~~-~ J4 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting ~ ~ 
Although I join the opinion of the Chief 
Justice, I write separately to emphasize that no 
prior decision of this Court justifies today's 
intrusion upon the legitimate powers of Members of 
Congress. 
The Court's analysis starts with the 
general proposition that "the judiciary is clearly 
discernible as the primary means through which 
[constitutional] rights may be enforced." Ante, at 
13. It leaps from this generalization to the 
conclusion that an individual who has suffered an 
injury to a constitutionallly protected interest, 
and who lacks an "effective" alternative, "must be 
able to invoke" federal court jurisdiction to 
vindicate his "justiciable constitutional rights". 
Id., at 14. (emphasis supplied). Apart from the 
dubious logic of this reasoning, I know of no 
precedent of this Court that supports such an 
absolute statement of the federal judiciary's 
obligation to entertain private suits that Congress 
has not authorized. On the contrary, I have 
2. 
thought it clear that federal courts must exercise 
a principled discretion when called upon to infer a 
private cause of action directly from the language 
of the Constitution. In the present case, for 
reasons summarized so well by the Chief Justice, 
principles of comity and separation of powers 
should require a federal court to stay its hand. 
To be sure, it has been clear - at least 
since Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) -that in appropriate 
circumstances private causes of action may be 
inferred from provisions of the Constitution.* 
*Paul: Here, include in a note the substance of the 
first couple of sentences on page 2 of your draft 
citing Cannon and noting the difference between 
inferring from provisions of the Constitution and 
inferring from a statute. I think it unwise for me 
to put my Cannon dissent in a prominent position in 
the next of th1s opinion. 
3. 
Moreover, the federal courts have a 
greater responsibilty under the Constitution for 
the protection of rights derived directly from it 
than for the definition and enforcement of rights 
created solely by Congress. Id., at 407 (Harlan, 
J., concurring). But the exercise of this 
responsibility involves discretion, and a weighing 
of relevant concerns. As Mr. Justice Harlan stated 
in Bivens, addressing this point, that the Court 
should "take into account [a range of policy 
considerations] at least as broad as the range of 
those a legislature would consider with respect to 
an express statutory authorization of a traditional 
remedy." Id., at 
Among the relevant policy consideration 
that a court certainly should consider in deciding 
whether to imply a constitutional right of action 
is that of comity toward an equal and coordinate 
branch of government. As Chief Justice Waite 
observed over a century ago, "One branch of 
government cannot encroach on the domain of another 
without danger. The safety of our institutions 
depends in no small degree on a strict observance 
4. 
of this salutary rule." Sinking Fund Cases, 9 Otto 
700, 718 (1878). Even where the authority of one 
branch over a matter is not exclusive, so that a 
federal court properly may accept jurisdiction over 
the dispute, we have recognized that the principle 
of separation of powers continues to have force as 
a matter of policy. For example, in United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), we held on the one 
hand that the question whether the President had a 
claim of privilege as to conversations with his 
advisers was an issue to be resolved by the 
judiciary, and on the other hand that separation-
of-powers considerations required the recognition 
of a qualified privilege. A similar approach 
should govern here. 
Whether or not the employment decisions of 
a member of Congress fall within the scope of the 
Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, it is 
clear that these decisions are intimately related 
to the conduct of his duties. As the Chief Justice 
observes, ante, a congressman necessarily relies on 
his personal staff in discharging his 
responsibilities. Because of the nature of his 
5. 
office, he must rely to an extraordinary degree on 
the loyalty and compatibility of everyone who works 
for him. Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 377-388 
( 1976) (Powell, J., dissenting). A 
congressman simply cannot perform his 
constitutional duties effectively, or serve his 
constituents properly, without a personally 
congenial as well as competent staff. 
The foregoing would seem self evident 
even if Congress had not clearly indicated an 
intention to reserve to its members the rights to 
select, employ and discharge staff personnel. But 
Congress unmistakably has made clear its view on 
this subject. It took pains to exempt itself from 
the coverage of Title VII ~Unless the Court is 
abandoning or modifying sub silentio our holding in 
B~own v~ General Servises Admin~st~~tion, 425 u.s. 
820 (1976), that Title VII as amended "provides the 
exclusive iudicial remedy for claims of 
discrimination in federal employment," id., at 835, 
the exemption from this statute for congressiona·l 
employees should bar all judicial relief. 
In sum, the decision of the Court today 
6. 
is not an exercise of principled discretion. Its 
opinion does not take into account the range of 
policy and constitutional considerations that we 
would expect a legislature to consider in 
determining whether a statutory remedy should be 
enacted. The principal of comity and the 
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers are 
given no weight. Indeed, in my view, the intrusion 
upon and the limiting of the traditional authority 
of a member of Congress to choose his own staff 
simply cannot be justified.* 
*The justification relief on by the Court is that 
it is the duty of courts to vindicate 
constitutional rights - a duty no one disputes. 
But it has never been thought that this duty 
required a blind exercise of judicial power without 
regard to other interests or constitutional 
principles. Indeed, it would not be unnatural for 
the Congress to consider today's intrusion to be 
wholly unwarranted, and to exercise its authority 
to reassert the proper balance between the 
legislative and judicial branches. If the reaction 
took the form of limiting the jurisdiction of 
federal courts this conceivably could frustrate the 
vindication of rights that properly are protected 
by the court. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
,juprttttt Qfcurl ttf Urt ~tb ~faits 
'jtasJrittgLm. ~. <If. 211~~~ J 
May 15, 1979 
Re: No. 78-5072 - Davis v. Passman 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
Although I join the opinion of THE CHIEF JusTICE, I write 
separately to emphasize that no prior decision of this Court 
justifies today's intrusion upon the legitimate powers of 
Membrrs of Congress. 
t 1-f . 
The Court's analysis starts with thr general proposition that 
"the judiciary is clearly disrrrnible as the primary means 
through which r constitutional] rights may be enforced," ante, 
~t 13. It leaps fro:n this grner~liz~t~on, in t9rJUS...llDCQntrmre~ J  
st!M, to the conclusiOn that an mchv1dual who has suffered an ~d~ 
injury to a constitutionally protected interest, and who lack an ---,- J 
"effective" alternative, "must be able to invoke the existing 
jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable 
constitutional rights." I d. , at 14 (emphasis supplied). Apart 
from the dubious logic of this reasoning. I know of no prece-
dent of this Court that supports such an absolute statement 
of the federal judiciary's obligation to entertain private suits 
that Congress has not authorized. On the contrary, I have 
thought it clear that federal courts must exercise a principled 
discretion when called upon to infer a private ca.use of action 
directly from the language of the Constitution. In the 
present case, for reasons well summarized by THE CHIEF Jus-
TICE, principles of comity and separation of powers should 
require a federal court to stay its hand. 
To be sure, it has been clear- at least since Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971)-that 
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in appropriate circumstances private causes of action may be 
inferred from provisions of the Constitution 1 oreover, the 
federal courts have a~ greater responsibility under the Con- .5 -k.-1-
stitution for the protection of those rights derived directly 
from it, than for the definition and enforcement of rights . 1 
created solely by Congress . .< Bivens, supra, at 407 (Harlan, 
J ., concurring). But the exercise of this responsibility in-
volves discretion, and a weighing of relevant concerns. As 
Mr. Justice Harlan observed in addressing this very point, a 
court should "take into account [a range of policy considera-
tions] at least as broad as the range of those a legislature 
would consider with respect to an express statutory authoriza-
tion of a traditional remedy." lbid.2 
have stated elsewhere my objections in princip e o e crea Ion of 
private statutory causes of action by federal courts, a process that permits 
the judiciary to arrogate to itself the power to re olve designated disputes ) 
in contravention of the constitutional obligation of Congress to make such 
decisions. See Cannon v. University of Chicago,- U.S.-,- (1979) 
(PowELL, J., dissenting). I agree that the implication of private actions 
from the provisions o the C nstitution Jresents a different problem. Id 
A court necessarily as wider latitu e m m erpretmg the 
Constitution than it does in construing a statute, McCulloch v. Maryland, 
4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819). aA4l its~lis-ai~mm:l ttnnightB"'guar-
~ S,. dts C81lSoti*tt;ie" !.! far gf~r. 
2 It is settled that where discretion exists, a variety of -factors rooted in 
the Constitution may lead a federal court to refuse to entertain an other-
wise properly presented constitutional claim. See, e. g., Moore v. Sims,-
U.S.- (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. 
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Iluffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); 
---ftml'l~~. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Alabama Public Service Commis-
sion v. Southe . Co., 341 U. S. 341 (1951); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 
319 U. S. 157 (194 , urford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943); Rail-
road Commission v. Pul nCo., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Ilawks v. Ilamill, 
288 U. S. 52 ( 1933). Tra · ionally the issue has arisen in the context of 
a federal court's exercise of i equity powers with respect to the States. 
~ncerns of comity A hat govern our dealings with the States 
should come into play when we are asked to interfere with the functioning 
of Congress. 
3 . ~ 
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Among those policies that a court certainly should consider 
in deciding whether to imply a constitutional right of action is 
that of comity toward an equal and coordinate branch of 
government. As Chief Justice Waite observed over a century 
ago, "One branch of government cannot encroach on the 
domain of another without danger. The safety of our institu-
tions depends in no small degree on a strict observance of this 
salutary rule." Sinking Fund Cases, 9 Otto 700, 718 (1878). 
Even where the authority of one branch over a matter is not 
exclusive, so that a federal court properly may accept jurisdic-
tion over the dispute, we have recognized that the principle of 
separation of powers continues to have force as a matter of 
policy. For example, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
683 (1974), we held on the one hand that the question whether 
the President had a claim of privilege as to conversations with 
his advisers was an issue to be resolved by the judiciary, and 
on the other hand that separation-of-powers considerations re-
quired the recognition of a qualified privilege. similar 
ach shoul ove e. 
Whether or not the employment decisions of a Member of 
Congress fall within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause 
of the Constitutioif, a question the Court does not reach today, 
It is clear that are bound up with the conduct of 
his duties. As THE CHIEF JusTICE observes, ante, a. Con-
gressman necessarily relies heavily on his personal staff in dis-
charging the duties of his office. Because of the nature of his 
office, he must rely to an extraordinary extent on the loyalty 
and compatibility of everyone who works for him. Cf. Elrod 
v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 377-388 (1976) (PowELL, J. , dissent-
ing). A Congressman simply cannot perform his constitu-
tional duties effectively, or serve his constituents properly, 
unless he is supported by a staff in which he has total 
confidence. 
The foregoing would seem self-evident even if Congress had 
/)4A-c c.l'i. 
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not indicat d . 
to e an Intention to reserv . 
. select, employ and dischar e to Its Members the ri 11t 
Interference. But Co ge staff personnel without . d' ~ 
________ v_ie_w_ o_n--=th:::.:i"'s_,s'-Y.Lu."""":.__J_,1g'*r-'e'-s-s , unmistakably ha J u 1C~a1 ----
lfp/ss 5/18/79 Rider A, p. 4 
It fails to weigh the legitimate interests of members of 
Congress. Indeed, the decision simply dismisses the 
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers as if it were 
immaterial. In my view, the serious intrusion upon the 
authority of members of Congress to choose and control their 
~
own staffs cannot be justified. 
A 
(1~85~): H ! F: cac·adrdfle, 7 Wall . . 506 ~(·;;~;)r. <XShG'old., 003 u. S. 323 ('Hi3s)·~ 
. r . e ense of th ' e on v s·zz 8 ) 
J_mJts of federal jurisd· t' c exclusive power of C . z ' How. 440 
. tJOn, 65 Colum. L Jc Jon, see Wechsler, The Cot ongress to define the 
Trust & Savings Co.· v ~~ll 1001, 1004-1008 (196;~ts a;d. the Constitu-
as support for the . ~ ' 281 U. S. 673, 682 1 . . rznlce?·hof!-Faris 
tions on its jurisdict~uth~nty of a federal court t(o 9r3~)' CJte~ by the Court 
t?e power of a state o~, ~s completely inapposite: T~Je~t legJslativ: limita-
nghts. This . . egJslature to limit the e Jssue there mvolved 
JS QUJte diif means of · d' . 
Fede?·az Governm t 1 erent from deciding wh. h vm JCatmg federal 
be enforced en Jas the authority to det J~ co-equal branch of the 
. ermme lJOw these . . h 
IJg ts may 
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upon ~he au}?.r~y of~ M~mber of Conlress to choose tis own 
staff s1mpl;z;nnot be J st1fied! / -
4 The justification the Court relies upon is the duty of federal courts 
to vindicate constitutional rights-a duty no one disputes. But it never 
has been thought that this duty required a blind exercise of judicial power 
without regard to other interests or constitutional principles. Indeed, it 
would not be unnatural for Congress to consider today's action unwarranted 
and to exercise its authority to reassert the proper balance between the 
legislative and judicial branches. If the reaction took the form of limiting 
the jurisdiction of federal courts, the effect conceivable could be to frus-
trate the vindication of rights properly protected by the Court. 
